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The Representational Dialectic
(With Illustrations from Obscenity,
Forfeiture, and Accident Law)
Anita Bernsteint
Human understanding derives from a "representational dialectic,"
whereby abstractions make sensory experiences intelligible. The first
element of this dialectic, a human tendency to focus on the concrete,
may be called "depictionalism." The second element, an effort to sub-
sume the concrete within an abstract organizing principle, may be
called "rationalism." A struggle between these two modes, one focused
on the tangible or images of the tangible, and the other privileging ab-
stract schemas such as language, has been underway for millennia.
Most realms of culture, including philosophy, religion, art, politics, and
some of the sciences, provide evidence of this conflict. In attempting to
overcome the appeal of depictionalism, advocates and proponents of
rationalism frequently equate depictionalism with primitive or magical
thinking-in short, error. In this Article, Anita Bernstein argues that
lawmakers and law reformers have aligned themselves with rationalism,
and that ignoring or slighting depictionalism has hindered both under-
standing of the law and the creation of optimal legal rules. Using
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obscenity, forfeiture, and accident law as examples, Professor Bernstein
shows the representational dialectic at work in the law, and discusses its
implications for doctrinal clarity, law reform, and political accountabil-
ity of the state.
INTRODUCTION
My ten-syllable mouthful is simpler than it sounds:
"representational dialectic" refers to a familiar dichotomy in human
cognition and understanding.' Our intellect tries to make order of its
environment by two opposing-and complementary -methods.
Bertrand Russell called these two methods "knowledge by acquain-
tance"' and "knowledge by description."3 Knowledge by acquaintance
occurs through sensory perception. In contrast, knowledge by descrip-
tion refers to understanding conveyed through verbal formulations and
mental abstractions.
Western philosophers have produced numerous accounts of the
operation of a dialectic between these two methods of acquiring under-
standing.' Representations understood through acquaintance- objects,
things, depictions put literally before a perceiving individual-depend
on abstractions in order to be understood.' In turn, knowledge by
1. A dialectic, writes Elizabeth Schneider, "stands for the idea of the process, connection, and
opposition of dualities, and for subsequent change and transcendence." Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L REv. 589,
599 (1986).
2. Knowledge by acquaintance describes the human understanding of things: "we have
acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process
of inference or any knowledge of truths." BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 46
(Oxford Univ. Press reprint 1969) (1912) (emphasis in original). Knowledge by acquaintance
corresponds with the verb connaitre in French and kennen in German. See id. at 44.
3. In contrast to knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description refers to the
understanding of truths, conveyed and understood through verbal formulation. See id. at 52. This type
of knowledge corresponds to the verbs savoir and wissen. See id. at 44. As Russell elaborates,
knowledge by description rests on prior knowledge by acquaintance: "In spite of the fact that we can
only know truths which are wholly composed of terms which we have experienced in acquaintance,
we can yet have knowledge by description of things we have never experienced." Id. at 59.
4. For a philosophical description of the dialectic, see JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. II, ch. 11, §§ 2-4 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975)
(1690) (drawing a dichotomy between "the objects of sensation" and "the operation of our minds" as
the sources of ideas). The philosophers W.V. Quine and Gottlob Frege similarly contrast knowledge
de re, or "through the thing," with knowledge de dicto, or "said." See Roger F. Gibson, In
Conversation: W.V. Quine, 104 MIND 637, 644 (1995) (book review). Psychologists use the term
"object relations" to describe the dialectic. See PAUL R. MILLER, SENSE AND SYMBOL 31 (1967)
(describing object relations as the developing individual's experience of tangible objects). See also
Ernst von Glasersfeld, Sensory Experience, Abstraction, and Teaching, in CONSTRUCTIVISM IN
EDUCATION 369, 374-75 (Leslie P. Steffe & Jerry Gale eds., 1995) (describing acquisition of
abstractions through interaction with particulars, as understood in learning theory).
5. Descartes, for instance, wrote that images and sensory experiences are intelligible only in a
context of reason and intellectual conception. See RENE DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy,
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description-verbal and mental representations-often relies on illustra-
tions drawn from the physical world to explain or convince. 6
Consider the sky, for example. Astronomers have helped to order
the night sky into concepts: lay persons know the meaning of
"planet," "galaxy," and "solar system" because of scientific taxon-
omy oriented toward unification, rather than through their sensory per-
ception of a personal and visual "night sky." At the same time,
"astronomy" urges skygazers to "see" big hurtling orbs instead of,
say, light shining through a pinpricked cloth-and perhaps instead of
the "heavens" described in the book of Genesis, created divinely on a
fourth day as a background above the earth.7
With the example of astronomy-and-religion I mean to advert to
political (and, inevitably, legal) conflict. Galileo's famous collision with
the dominant scientific and religious systems of his culture demonstrates
what happens when perceptions are reordered according to new abstrac-
tions.' The study of legal change in the United States reveals a similar
strife: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description work
together but also separately, and stand at opposite ends of a political
struggle. The battle has riven numerous areas of American law, of which
I have chosen three-obscenity, forfeiture, and accident law-for par-
ticular attention.' Not only legal doctrines but academic reconceptions
Fifth Meditation, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 1, 44-49 (John Cottingham et al.
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984).
6. See DAVID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES 191 (1989) ("The mind has no choice: it
lapses into visualization in order to grasp all but the purely ecstatic, syllogistic, and
arithmetical .... ); cf. HARRY REDNER, A NEW SCIENCE OF REPRESENTATION 39-43 (1994)
(describing the function of Hermes, or Mercury, the god of messages and commerce, who uses
physical things to express ideas and thus build culture); RICHARD A. WATSON, REPRESENTATIONAL
IDEAS 2 (1995) (referring to "ideas as effects and things as causes").
7. See Genesis 1:14-18 (THE SONCINO CHUMASH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES WITH
HAPHTAROTH, A. Cohen ed., The Soncino Press 1947) (referring to m'orot b'rekeah hashamaim,
lights in the firmament of the heavens); cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 273
(Norman Kemp Smith trans., St. Martin's Press 1965) (1781) (using the example of astronomy to
distinguish mundus sensibilis, the world apprehended through the senses, from mundus intelligibilis,
the world apprehended through intellect).
8. See JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 216 (1973); Owen Gingerich, The Galileo
Affair, SCl. AM., Aug. 1982, at 132.
9. Tangible physical objects play a prominent role elsewhere in American law, which
frequently asserts that their presence in a dispute or transaction calls for separate doctrinal treatment.
One can scarcely count all the ways. For statutory recognition of physical objects, see, for example,
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994) (making it illegal to form tying arrangements where both the
tying and tied goods are tangible); 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1994) (authorizing customs inspectors to examine
"any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom.., they shall suspect there is merchandise subject
to duty"); U.C.C. art. 2 (1995) (pertaining to sales of goods). See also United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d
113, 114 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974) (relying on expert testimony by an anthropologist to decide statutory
claim regarding cultural property). Expressions of concern with physical objects in the common law
of torts and property include "bailments," see Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1208 (Fla.
1997); "conversion," see Wallander v. Barnes, 671 A.2d 962, 971 (Md. 1996); and "personalty," see
General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, 696 A.2d 683, 690 (N.J. 1997). The common law of crimes
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of doctrine have been caught in the ancient dialectic. An understanding
of this struggle, I will argue, illuminates fundamental debates about the
nature and objectives of law.
Though well delineated, the two sides of the dialectic are not quite
so well labeled, and thus one is forced to coin phrases. Hence I will use
the word "depictionalism" for the stance associated with knowledge by
acquaintance, which focuses on the presence or representation of a
physical object.'" The contrary stance, which emphasizes abstract con-
cepts and verbal description, will be "rationalism.""
As I elaborate in Parts I and II, the dialectical conflict has not pro-
ceeded evenhandedly. It is in the main a history of the perseverance of
depictionalism under attack by rationalism, which seeks to bury once
identifies object-related concepts: "forgery," "smuggling," "theft," and the like. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 650, 1389, 1477 (6th ed. 1990). Civil procedure recognizes in rem (thing-related)
jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying note 172 (relating in rem jurisdiction to civil forfeiture);
evidence law considers physical objects in its rules on authentication, spoliation, and "writings,
recordings and photographs," see, e.g., FED. R. EVlD. 1006. Moving beyond the United States, legal
anthropologists have built a literature of the "law of things" situated within culture. See, e.g.,
Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Lav and Society in
Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 791, 792-94 (1995) (citing sources); id. at
823-25 (relating legal anthropology to trademarks); Andrew Huxley, Golden Yoke, Silken Tent, 106
YALE L.J. 1885 (1997) (book review) (providing examples of the law of things in Tibet and ancient
China).
The three subjects that receive close attention in this Article are representative of this vast
expanse. They cover criminal and civil law; the example of forfeiture covers terrain in between. See
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 n.9 (1886) (calling civil forfeiture "quasi-criminal"). They
are expressed in both statutory and common law rules, and they reveal connections to the larger
representational dialectic. When appropriate, the Article refers to illustrations outside of obscenity,
forfeiture, and accident law.
10. Slightly more graceful terms such as "objectivism" and "representationalism" are already
occupied by different philosophical concepts, and are sometimes used to describe knowledge by
description, rather than the knowledge by acquaintance that I need a word to connote. See, e.g.,
LEONARD PEIKOFF, OBJECTIVISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND (1991) (describing Rand's
philosophy of objectivism, based on rationality and principles of "enlightened selfishness"); William
G. Weaver, Note, Richard Rorty and the Radical Left, 78 VA. L. REv. 729, 730 (1992) (calling Plato's
philosophy of highly abstract, rationalist ideals "representationalism"); Anthony J. Sebok, Book
Review, 93 CAN. J. L. & Juus. 457, 459-60 (1998) (reviewing Law and Truth by Dennis Patterson)
(invoking Patterson's use of "representationalism" to refer to philosophy of language). My colleague
Richard Warner, a philosopher, has suggested "antipropositionalism," but inasmuch as I believe that
knowledge by acquaintance is prior to knowledge by description, see supra notes 2-3 and infra notes
334-335 and accompanying text, this negative locution, to my mind, does not quite describe what is
termed depictionalism here. Russell's "knowledge by acquaintance," see supra note 2, describes
almost precisely what I mean by depictionalism, but in the interest of brevity I prefer a single word to
a prepositional phrase.
11. Like "representationalism," this word has an extensive set of meanings in philosophy and
elsewhere. Bernard Williams, after noting the existence of "several different outlooks and
movements of ideas" that fall under this rubric, supplies a working definition: "the philosophical
outlook or program which stresses the power of a priori reason to grasp substantial truths about the
world." Bernard Williams, Rationalism, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 69, 69 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967). I use rationalism as an umbrella term, covering morality, efficiency, deterrence,
corrective justice, incentives, and other such ambitions associated with the law.
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and for all the "superstition,"' 2 the "fetishism,"'3 the "idolatry,"14 the
"silly animism,"'5  the "primitive" thinking, 6  and the "bizarre
havoc"'' caused by depictionalism's focus on the tangible. Although
seldom defended as such, depictionalism holds its ground against
charges that it obstructs philosophical, theological, economic, political,
and social coherence and clarity. Perhaps it endures, I argue, because
knowledge by acquaintance is fundamental to any kind of understand-
ing. Depictionalism perseveres also because rationalists say it
does: most rationalists share a habit of identifying depictionalism with
the backward past, and call abstraction part of current and future en-
lightenment. In Part I of this Article, I provide a short historical survey
of the never-successful rationalist endeavor in Western culture to super-
sede depictionalism in religion, politics, psychology, and the visual arts.
American law, particularly as it has been shaped by reformers and
academic critics, reveals a similar pattern of depictionalist perseverance
in the face of rationalist attack. Despite the extraordinary influence of
law and economics (the quintessential rationalist ideology) and its tenet
that markets can price and exchange almost anything, 9 including legal
12. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway
Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L Rv. 1, 6 (1994) (claiming that civil
forfeiture rests on an "irrational and superstitious idea" that property can be guilty).
13. See infra text accompanying note 77 (discussing Marxist theory).
14. The Judaic ban on idolatry appears in Exodus 20:4 (THE SONCINO CHUMASH: THE FIVE
BOOKS OF MOSES wITH HAPHTAROTH, A. Cohen ed., The Soncino Press, 1947). The subject
receives thorough philosophical treatment in MOSHE HALBERTAL & AvisHsA MARGALIT, IDOLATRY
(1992).
15. Deborah Duseau & David Schoenbrod, Overbroad Civil Forfeiture Laivs Are
Unconstitutionally Vague, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L Rev. 285, 292 (1994).
16. ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE AcT OF CREATION 321 (1964).
17. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (1995).
18. Even the Oprah Winfrey trial of 1998 brought forth this complaint. See Stephen Hymes,
Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Tnmas, Jan. 29, 1998, at A22 (arguing that food disparagement statutes are
dubious because they "implicitly imbue[ inanimate objects with the human element of character").
19. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Flaved Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular
Type ol Economics, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 1197, 1199 (1997) (noting "commitment" of law and
economics "to the commensurability of all an agent's ends"). Professor Nussbaum gives as an
example of this commitment the practice of measuring a nation's "quality of life" simply by its GNP
per capita. Id. at 1202.
An illustration of how law and economics disdains the physical object comes from a talk that
Judge Frank Easterbrook, a noted devotee of this approach, once presented. Easterbrook mockingly
coined the phrase "the law of the horse." Case law, Easterbrook explained, is full of horse licenses,
horses that kick, sales of horses, and the veterinary standard of care for medical treatment of horses.
But the law rightly lacks an equine category: its task is to focus on general rules and principles,
including "contract, intellectual property, privacy, free speech and the like." David Post, Has
Cyberspace Lmv Come of Age?, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 1998, at 78 (arguing that cyberspace law is now
more than "the law of the horse").
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remedies,' the physical object occupies an unbudging place in legal
doctrine."1 Having once addressed the power of objects in products li-
ability,22 here I want to think about depictionalism more generally, and
look for the sources of its strength. Part II of this Article conveys some
of this power with reference to the law of obscenity, forfeiture, and acci-
dents.
Each of these areas of law has absorbed rationalist criticism, but
only to partial avail; law reform proposals that followed or accompanied
such criticism failed to eliminate dependence on the tangible, or images
of the tangible, from these areas of the law. Obscenity doctrine still
criminalizes the essence of a work, such as a videotape or a novel, rather
than the behavioral hazards to public order that normally concern the
criminal law.' Civil asset forfeiture personifies inanimate objects, con-
demning them for the taint of moral guilt, even where such a determi-
nation means that innocent people have to suffer-and at the hands of
the state-in consequence.24 Accident law finds tangible things crucial in
two of its important doctrines, pure economic loss and products liabil-
ity.' Thus, within the world of torts, an area professedly concerned with
public policy, corrective justice, deterrence, economic efficiency, and
the like,26 the image of a corporeal thing can stand, lumplike, in the path
of these goals. Depictionalism thus challenges the very center of civil
and criminal law.27
20. See Ronald A. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 2-8 (1960) (identifying
legal remedies as an element of the costs and benefits associated with certain kinds of activity, and
arguing that individuals can price and exchange them).
21. See supra note 9.
22. See Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1 (1995).
23. See PAUL IL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1997) (reciting "the familiar litany of
purposes of criminal law sanctions-just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous,
and rehabilitation"). Joel Feinberg's four-volume The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law consists of an
extended argument that harm or offense is necessary to justify a criminal prohibition: harm must be
the principal reason for criminalization, whereas offense has a narrower province and does not
simply emanate from objects. Offense, according to Feinberg, requires that someone be offended.
Actions "are immoral (better indecent) because they offend; they do not offend because they are
judged to be, in their essential nature, immoral." 4 JOEL FEINBERO, THE MORAL LIMITS OF 'HE
CRIMINAL LAW 15-16 (1988). See also infra Section lI.A.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See infra Section lI.C.
26. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNcTiONS OF TORT LAW 14-19
(1997) (listing "functions of tort law": corrective justice, optimal deterrence, loss distribution,
compensation, and redress of social grievances).
27. The legal concept of property, however, is an unusual bastion of depictionalism. Property
indeed may amount to the greatest triumph of knowledge by acquaintance in American law. Despite
scholarly arguments that the subject lacks inherent content and is instead a description of rights
among persons, see, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARmz. ST.
L.J. 1075, 1079 (1997) (citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 61
(1964)), property law recognizes that its first task "is not to resolve disputes between people over
resources, but to establish a relation between a person and an identifiable thing," Sherwin, supra at
1086. Professor Sherwin goes on to note that "physical objects.., continue to have considerable
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This description of depictionalism identifies a barrier to law reform
that has not yet been examined: neglect of depictionalism yields both
conceptual and strategic errors. At the conceptual level, reformist aca-
demics rely on rationalist social science findings to buttress their pro-
posals for legal change, without scrutinizing these sources for
descriptive accuracy. Consider, for example, the well-known experi-
mental study that set up a market where cash, tokens, and coffee mugs
were to be traded among the undergraduate subjects. The study found
that students traded tokens for cash in happy equilibrium, following a
smooth pattern of supply and demand curves, but refused to "sell"
their coffee mugs for the price in tokens that economic theory would
dictate.s The designers of the study refer to this anomalous outcome as
"the endowment effect," which they define as loss aversion, the idea
that people deem losses weightier than gains.29 They never directly con-
front the possibility that a coffee mug with the Cornell logo might sig-
nify something different from its "equivalent" in tokens and money,
even though their experiment proved exactly that. The researchers pre-
fer to interpret their subjects' behavior in terms of gains versus losses-
a vocabulary with which professional economists feel comfortable-
even though the idea of a market, if it says anything, denies that buyers
"gain" at the expense of sellers who "lose." Academic lawyers con-
sume misperceptions like these and build policy on them: a clearer
sense of what constitute losses and gains might yield a better conclu-
sion. 0 Such a determination demands that the policymaker abandon the
comfortable familiarity of money-language, and look at the object.
At the level of pragmatic strategy, frustrated activists who fail to
effect legal change tend to misplace blame; they look for familiar vil-
lains. Conservative temperaments, entrenched financial interests, public
cowardice, institutional resistance (coming from ideological antagonists
on the bench, legislators who cannot defy the predictions of public
choice theory, and nonacquiescent administrators), and the problem of
significance" in property law. Id. at 1091. Describing this stance of property law in conversation with
me, Bailey Kuklin has suggested the helpful metaphor of a telescope: contract, tort, and criminal law
regard things as instruments, with people at the end; property law, following depictionalism, will often
reverse the telescope to make endpoints of physical objects.
28. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. PoL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
29. Id. at 1327.
30. For instance, one law review article argues that the endowment effect, among other insights
of behavioral law and economics, should be used to inform policy. The authors propose that to
encourage women to perform breast self-examination, the state should not bother to create
regulations or taxes that punish the failure to examine one's breasts. Instead it should exploit the
human tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains, and print "pamphlets that stress the negative
consequences of a refusal to undertake self-examination." See Christine lolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1536-37 (1998).
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collective action are among the oft-cited obstacles.3' Writers who do not
share the law reform goal at issue may say that reform failed because it
was ill-conceived.3" All of these post hoc judgments stay within the
premises and tenets of rationalism. As explanations for outcomes, they
may well be right. I am arguing, however, that they are often incom-
plete. If depictionalism also stands in the way of law reform, then both
advocates of change and their resisters need to reassess law reform as it
is now practiced and studied.
Accordingly, Parts III and IV analyze depictionalism as a cultural
force that intersects with legal doctrine. Part III explores the congruence
of depictionalism with theories of human behavior derived from phi-
losophy, psychology, and political theory. In arguing that depictional-
ism lines up with philosophical traditions, learning theory, and indeed
liberal politics, I hope to show that the dumber, less articulate half of the
representational dialectic not only is here to stay, but occasionally yields
benevolent effects. The last Section of Part III concludes by praising
depictionalism as a brake on law reform. Notwithstanding the infamous
history of "all deliberate speed,"33 some reforms do move too fast.
Shifting to favor the other side of the dialectic, Part IV assesses
depictionalism from the vantage point of one rationalist objection. It is
idle, I think, for rationalist law reformers to thunder against superstition
and irrationality in the law. Rationalism has available a more serious
avenue of both thought and action, pertaining to freedom. "State inter-
ference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good," as Oliver
Wendell Holmes famously wrote;' here I argue that depictionalism
tends paradoxically to bolster state interference of a centralized kind,
despite its eclecticism and pluralism. If the danger of rationalism is its
tendency to reduce physical objects and images of physical objects to
abstractions or verbal expressions-the better to centralize control-
then the danger of depictionalism is that its focus on physical objects
conceals an equivalent control, a statist encroachment into human
liberty. The example of forfeiture provides the clearest illustration,
31. See generally RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995) (attributing law
reform failures in part to racism and conservatism); Simon Bronitt & Bernadette McSherry, The Use
and Abuse of Counseling Records in Sexual Assault Trials: Reconstructing the "Rape Shield"?, 8
CRim. L.F. 259, 290 (1997) (summarizing explanations for failures of rape reform laws); Michael H.
LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and DuPont Compliance Analysis for the
TEAM Act, 71 NOTRE DAME L REv. 215, 225-26 (1996) (detailing political barriers to labor law
reform). See generally Anita Bernstein, How to Make a Nev Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEx. L REV.
1539 (1997) (noting explanations for law reform failure).
32. See Bernstein, supra note 31, at 1543, 1557-58 (noting criticism of reform policies deemed
radical or unmanageable); Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The
Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L 181, 351-81
(1993) (defending traditional tort rules of causation in the face of reform proposals).
33. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
34. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
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although the point has been made also in the context of products liabil-
ity, another depictionalist bastion.35
In the end I am rooting for rationalism to gain ground in the on-
going struggle that characterizes the dialectic.36 Rationalism enjoys con-
siderable influence in most areas of American law-it pervades the
regulation of commerce, for instance, and underlies public law as well as
the law of torts-and the rationalist nature of these doctrines contributes
to their legitimacy by helping to make them intelligible." Any law-
based coercion that cannot be rendered intelligible through words, as
exists in obscenity and forfeiture and accident law and other fields of
doctrine, probably needs to be reformed." Only rationalism can meet
the glorious demand that liberal political theorists call "public justifica-
tion" - that is, the requirement that all legal rules ought to withstand a
query of how they advance the public good.39 Laws in an enlightened
and democratic society ought to be amenable to explanation. When it
finally gives depictionalism its due, rationalism will gain power to im-
prove the law.
I
THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN DEPICTIONALISM AND RATIONALISM
The struggle of rationalism to supersede depictionalism is as old as
any other Western intellectual or religious tradition. At the beginning of
the common era Greek and Judeo-Christian thinkers became the first
major participants in the representational dialectic. Other religions be-
gan to assert their "aniconism," or aversion to the veneration of
35. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY 161 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility,
48 Omo ST. L.J. 469,475-77 (1987). See generally Richard Overton, An Arrow Against All Tyrants,
in THE LIBERTARIAN READER 121-22 (David Boaz ed., Free Press 1997) (1646) (arguing that the
sovereign has the power only to act for the common good; because every man is "a king, priest and
prophet," he is entitled to a government of limited powers).
36. Philosophers warn that a dialectic is not a tug-of-war but rather an ongoing, restless
relationship among negating, affirming, and transcending moments. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN,
PRAXIS AND ACTION 20-21 (1971); cf. ALLEN W. WOOD, HEGEL'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 3 (1990)
(attacking vulgarization of Hegelian dialectical method, especially through "grotesque jargon" and
"ridiculous expository devices"). In this spirit, I have not taken sides, nor put money on one of two
horses, but rather tried to inform a continuing relation that will remain dynamic. Neither side can
vanquish the other.
37. On rationalist themes in American law, see, for example, EDWIN W. PATTERSON,
JURISPRUDENCE 189-94 (1953) (noting social importance of making law intelligible to lay persons);
Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 674 (1998) (connecting
"thinking" with the traditional legitimacy of law).
38. Cf. Forfeiting Fairness, N.Y. Ttrsns, Mar. 8, 1996, at A30 ("When the nation's highest court
displays indifference to unfair actions by government against people who have done nothing wrong, it
invites cynicism about the institution and the justice system generally.").
39. This demand permeates American law and politics. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL
VIRTUES 39-40 (1990); JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19, 144 (1971).
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tangible images. Over the next two thousand years, rationalists moved
the dialectic into new domains.
A. Icons, Aniconism, and Iconoclasm
Condemnation of idolatry-that is to say, hostility toward a type of
depictionalism that endowed tangible objects with religious signifi-
cance-has remained constant in Western theologies, while agreement
about what constitutes idolatry has shifted. Judaism and Christianity
have for many centuries asserted the truth of monotheistic abstraction.
In antiquity, leaders of these faiths condemned pagan religion for its
emphasis on earthly particulars like the wind and the rain, equating this
taste for natural images with idolatry.' Debates between' the two camps
on the subject of depictionalism were recorded in the second and third
centuries.4' These debates revealed that neither monotheism nor pagan-
ism could be equated with either depictionalism or rationalism. Moreo-
ver the Greeks, who simultaneously were "idolators" and framers of
philosophical abstractions including the idea of divinity, claimed some
of the ideological territory of monotheism while defending their pagan
religion.42 For his contributions to the rationalist cause, one Greek phi-
losopher, Xenophanes, has been credited with membership in a
"religious Enlightenment" whose modern members include Kant and
Feuerbach.43
Later Christian history displayed the representational dialectic in its
more famous struggles. In the eighth century, about four hundred years
after church buildings began to display paintings of Christ and the
saints, iconoclasts-"idol-smashers" opposed to the use of images-
prevailed on the Byzantine monarchy to ban the veneration of images.44
Christian defenders of icons retorted that since Christ was willing to be-
come a man, images that showed the Logos as a physical, incarnated
being were appropriate to the religion; neo-Platonist philosophers
joined the fray, defending images as didactically necessary. 4
40. See generally HALBERTAL & MARGALIT, supra note 14 (discussing idolatry as a source of
"error" in some ancient religious traditions); 2 ARNOBIUS OF SICCA, THE CASE AGAINST THE
PAGANS 440, 452-80, 461,499 (George E. McCracken trans., Newman Press 1949) (noting fourth-
century Christian critique of pagan religion for its temples and images, associations of the rain with
Jupiter, anthropomorphic conception of the winds, and sex differentiation among gods).
41. See W.H.C. Frend, Mission Conversion: Proselytizing in the Religious History of the Roman
Empire, 48 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 302, 302-03 (1997).
42. See FREEDBERG, supra note 6, at 61 (crediting Greek philosophy for the beliefs that intellect
outweighs sensory perception and that the deity cannot be represented in material form).
43. See HALBERTAL & MARGALIT, supra note 14, at 129-30.
44. See DANIEL J. SAHAS, ICON AND LOGOS: SOURCES IN EIGHTH-CENTURY ICONOCLASM 32-
35 (1986).
45. See id. at 94-96; Veneration of Images, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 113 (Mircea
Eliade ed., 1987).
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Iconoclasm rocked the Church again during the Reformation and
continued the representational dialectic. Sixteenth-century Protestant
leaders, notably Ulrich Zwingli and Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt,
declared that the Church had fallen "ankle-deep in the 'filth' of im-
ages, relics, altars, holy places, and miraculous hosts. 46 Karlstadt's
1522 pamphlet, "On the Abolition of Images," also known as the
Abthung, launched what has been called the Protestant theology of
idolatry.47 Iconoclastic violence followed these iconoclastic pronounce-
ments. Image-smashing riots spread through France in the years 1560
to 1562,48 and virtually every hamlet and city in the Netherlands shook
with similar attacks in late 1566. 4" In England the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries witnessed great destruction in consequence of icono-
clastic theology, beginning with the Reformation and continuing with
Puritan hatred of Catholic aesthetics." Idols did not remain
smashed: following the tendency of depictionalism to withstand ration-
alist attacks, images survived the Reformation."'
Other religions have made a theological issue of depictionalism.
Scholars have attempted to plot a continuum of beliefs about images
among religious creeds, putting religions such as Islam that are hostile
to images, or "aniconically inclined," at one end and religions that fa-
vor images, such as Hinduism, at the other. 2 But the task has proved dif-
ficult. Muslim hostility toward idolatry, for example, has not wiped out
images but confined them to such places as architectural settings (such
as bath tiles) and secular books; moreover, the Qur'an is equivocal on
the subject, expressing hostility for "idolators" rather than idols. 3
Yahweh, the god that would not be seen, is nevertheless observed in his
effects and manifestations.' Moreover, religions associated with statues
46. CARLOS M.N. Em, WAR AGAINST THE IDOLS 54-55 (1986).
47. See id. at 57-58 & n.19 (citations omitted).
48. See id. at 279-80.
49. See FREEDBERG, supra note 6, at 385.
50. See JOHN PHILLIPS, THE REFORMATION OF IMAGES 144 (1973).
51. This survival of Catholic images endured beyond the Catholic Church. See generally
Raymond A. Mentzner, The Persistence of "Superstition and Idolatry" Among Rural French
Calvinists, 65 CHURCH HIsr. 220 (1996) (noting that conversions away from Catholicism did not
eliminate old rites involving images in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century French peasant
communities).
52. See Veneration of Images, supra note 45, at 101.
53. See id.
54. See CHRISTOPHER COLLINS, READING THE WRITTEN IMAGE: VERBAL PLAY,
INTERPRETATION, AND THE ROOTS OF ICONOPHOBIA 34 (1991). The Hebrew word Yahweh is
translated as "I am that I am," see Exodus 3:14 (THE SONCINO CHUMASH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF
MOSES WITH HAPHTAROTH, A. Cohen ed., The Soncino Press, 1947), connoting an existence that is
completely inaccessible to the human senses. One scholar prefers to define Yahweh as "He is
continuing to be," and mentions another Hebrew name for God, ehyeh asher ehyeh, or "I will be that
I will be." Bernard Horn, Spies, Sacrifices and Fringes, 20 ESSAYS ON LITERATURE 31, 53 (1993).
For a philosophical discussion of how God can be named without ever having been perceived, see
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and images, such as the belief systems of ancient Egypt, Greece, and
Rome, all went through episodes of iconoclasm." Other creeds are of
two or more minds on the question of images. 6 Established religions
have oscillated for millennia. Neither depicted imagery nor pure ab-
straction conquers the other; religions waver on their doctrine of icons
and aniconism.
As studied by the Israeli philosophers Moshe Halbertal and Avishai
Margalit, the history of Western religion reveals a debate over the nature
of "idolatry," and this debate mirrors the representational dialectic.
Halbertal and Margalit identify a conceptual "chain of criticism of re-
ligion."'57 First monotheistic religions attack idolatry; next philosophi-
cally oriented authorities on monotheistic religions criticize "folk
practitioners" for their "idolatrous assumptions and errors with respect
to the divinity, especially on issues such as God's corporeality;"" the
secular Enlightenment then criticizes religion generally for its depend-
ence on rites and symbols; and finally the criticism of ideology attacks
the secular Enlightenment for its dependence on a fiction of objectivity
that yields idols in the form of imaginary reifications, such as nation,
race, and class. 9 Each link in the chain of Western religious criticism
perceives itself as more rational-because less depictionalist-than the
earlier link that it attacks.' Yet depictionalism in religion and political
thought endures."
B. Political Economy
In the secular realm, developments in the area of political economy
reveal the same desire to achieve progress by superseding depictional-
ism with rationalism.62 Capitalism and Marxism found a common target
Jerome I. Gellman, Naming, and Naming God, 29 RELIGIOUS STUD. 193, 216 n.40 (1993) (noting that
YHVH, the direct transliteration of the Hebrew word often represented as "Yahweh," has no
semantic meaning, according to one "strand of thinking in the Jewish tradition").
55. See FREEDBERG, supra note 6, at 389.
56. See id. at 62 ("Christians made images-even of their God-just like everyone else.").
57. HALBERTAL & MARGALIT, supra note 14, at 112.
58. Id. at 113.
59. See id. at 112-15. See also THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND
PHILOSOPHERS 256 (J.O. Urmson & Jonathan Rre eds., rev. ed. 1989) (stating that "[tihe post-
modernist desire to escape the superstitions of a preceding epoch is not so much a break with
traditional modernity, as a repetition of its oldest refrain").
60. One scholar goes further, arguing that the development of alphabets and the rise of literacy
as a political and cultural force "subliminally coaxed users to be extremely intolerant of iconic
systems and other beliefs in general." Leonard Shlain, The Curse of Literacy, UTNE READER, Sept.-
OcL 1998, at 71, 73. See generally LEONARD SHLAIN, THE ALPHABET VERSUS THE GODDESS (1998)
(exploring implications of the triumph of words (or rationalism) over images (or depictionalism)).
61. See infra notes 295-298 and accompanying text.
62. Weber connected capitalism and the Reformation, arguing that the "powerful tendency
toward uniformity of life, which today so immensely aids the capitalistic interest in the standardization
of production, had its ideal foundations in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh." MAX WEIER,
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in depictionalist beliefs,63 deeming them vestiges of an obsolete past.'
The political and economic ethos that accompanied industrialization in
Europe and the United States claimed that money was a universal matrix
by which a thing valued in the market-land, labor, consumer goods,
intellectual property, fractional ownership of a business corporation-
could be measured in terms of another valued commodity. In this ide-
ology, any competing claim about the uniqueness of an object was at
best primitive sentimentalism-if not a direct impediment to profit, as
Henry Ford taught when he insisted in 1913 that his Model T plant use
interchangeable parts.6"
Nineteenth-century developments in business history such as the
large-scale separation of corporate ownership from control,' the prolif-
eration of new contractual relationships,67 the spread of stock and fu-
tures exchanges,6" and the growth of an urban working class drawn from
foreign countries and rural America69 all testified to the power of ab-
straction over visible objects and traditions," such as bartering71 and the
family farm.72 Never defeated, depictionalism asserted itself alongside
THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 169 (Talcott Parsons trans., Charles
Scribner's Sons 1930) (1920). See also EIRE, supra note 46, at 311-13 (using "rationalism" to link the
revolutions of Copernicus and Calvin: "Faith was reasonable, it had to make sense.").
63. See infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
64. Philosophical affinities between Marxism and capitalism have been amply noted and
studied. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 26, 32-33 (1958)
(discussing common ground of Marx and "the central tradition" of liberal capitalist political
economics); KARL. POLANYi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 25 (1944) (arguing that devotion to the
gold standard left "capitalists and socialists miraculously united. Where Ricardo and Marx were at
one, the nineteenth century knew not doubt.").
65. See Drew Winter, The Mass Production Revolution, WARD's AIuTo WORLD, May 1996, at
101 (describing gains to Ford from interchangeable parts and the assembly line).
66. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 47 (1932).
67. During the nineteenth century, two major contractual contexts emerged in the United
States: statutes began to permit married women to enter into contracts, and the abolition of slavery
meant that servants all worked pursuant to employment contracts. See PATTERSON, supra note 37, at
410; cf. R.C. J. CocKs, SIR HENRY MAINE (1988) (discussing Maine's anthropological argument that
(rationalist) contract supersedes (depictionalist) status as societies progress).
68. See JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (1997); THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: THE FIRST 200 YEARS (James E. Buck ed.,
1992).
69. See Donald A. Hicks, Revitalizing Our Cities or Restoring Ties to Them? Redirecting the
Debate, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 815 (1994).
70. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR-, THE VISIBLE HAND 12 (1977) (relating
nineteenth-century business developments to the inexorable force of the market).
71. See Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, Winter 1996 at 59, 74 (noting that barter was superseded by "the advent of paper currency").
72. See Yoav Kislev & Willis Peterson, Prices, Technology, and Farm Size, 90 J. POL. ECON.
578, 579 (1982) (relating decline of the family farm to increases in urban wages); see also Jim Chen,
The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L REv. 809, 828 (1995) (stating that the late twentieth century
marks the decline of agriculture "as an autonomous enterprise and as a unique, independent way of
life").
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the triumphs of abstraction that characterized the Industrial Revolution
in the United States. Ornate architecture, elaborate fashions in clothes
and hairstyles, and conspicuous consumption marked the last two dec-
ades of the nineteenth century, making the abstraction of money visible
and palpable.
From his vantage point in the middle of the nineteenth century,
Karl Marx observed and attacked the tendency of capitalism to turn
tangible entities into abstraction73-a concept embedded in the Marxist
term "alienation" -while sharing with capitalism a taste for abstract
ideas powerful enough to defeat depictionalism. Building on the work
of earlier philosophers including Locke and Adam Smith, who had
characterized property as expressions of human personality, Marx ar-
gued that things were never completely external to man. Capital, for in-
stance, is accumulated human labor rather than an object with
independent meaning,74 and a house is small or large only with respect
to its surroundings and the perspective of its owner and onlookers.75
Sensory perception deceives: objects to Marx were functions of politi-
cal order, dependent on abstraction for their meaning. And because
"any particular concept of property is relative, historically determined
and ephemeral,"76 a political and economic revolution has the power to
effect not only distributive justice but reconceptions of physical subsis-
tence.
This power of the abstract to become tangible, and the tangible ab-
stract, was to Marx both lamentable and redemptive. What Marx called
"the fetishism of commodities," for instance, referred to a transforma-
tion whereby things become subjects and masters with human attributes,
while persons, workers and capitalists alike, are divested of their person-
ality.77 Yet Marx could simultaneously attack the bourgeoisie for strip-
ping human relationships of their "heavenly ecstasies," oriented
around religion and chivalry and sentiment, and substituting cold cash,
73. See HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 108-11 (1982) (outlining Marxist argument that
to the bourgeoisie, commodities embody a false notion that human labor is fungible).
74. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL 155-65 (Ben Fowkes, trans. Vintage Books 1977); see also
SHLoMo AVINERI, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 78 (1968); COLLINS,
supra note 73, at 111.
75. See AVINERI, supra note 74, at 80.
76. Id. at 82.
77. See id. at 118. The complexities of Marxist "alienation" threaten to obscure this illustration
of the representational dialectic. See MARX, supra note 74, at 163-77 (claiming that things are both
masters and sources of misunderstanding). For purposes of understanding the dialectic I describe, it is
of no moment which are more real, images or persons; what interests us is the facility by which one
can be said to become, or substitute for, the other. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L REv. 1849, 1872 (1987) (lamenting the law's tendency to commodify,
along the lines Marx proposed).
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"the icy water of egotistical calculation.""S Thus, on the one hand,
Marx thought capitalism embraced a foolish depictionalism, fetishizing
things; on the other hand, he deplored the heartless rationalism of mer-
cantile capitalism. Continuing the theme of rationalism superseding
depictionalism, Marx contended that although capitalism had destroyed
the concrete particulars of the past, the cure for this destruction was not
a return to depictionalism but a more enlightened-and more thor-
oughly abstract-redemptive ideology.79
Marxism and capitalism thus displayed common characteristics in
their expressions of the representational dialectic. Like the iconoclasts
who preceded them in theological realms, both shared a belief in a ra-
tionalist present and future that would supersede the depictionalist past."
Like aniconical religions, furthermore, Marxism and capitalism retained
depictionalist sentiments and left unresolved their contradictory attitudes
toward images.' But these nineteenth-century versions of the dialectic
were novel as well as familiar. The ambient ideal of progress gave new
power to these conflicting rationalist faiths in the power of abstraction,82
while political and economic change expanded the representational
dialectic beyond religion into the modern nation-state. At the turn of
the new century, rationalism-always the aggressor-pressed on, finding
new sites for the dialectic.
C. Early Twentieth-Century Rationalism: The Modernist Project
Rationalism found a power base in the work of Sigmund Freud,
who extended the applications of rationalism to psychology, philoso-
phy, sociology, and political theory. Freud found meaning in the ob-
jects found in fantasy and dreams, insisting that such images embody
ideas and emotions too harsh for an individual to accept undisguised."
78. KARL MARX & FREDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 135 (Harold J. Laski ed.,
Pantheon Books 1967) (1888).
79. See SIDNEY HOOK, MARX AND THE MARXISTS 11, 31-32 (1955) (describing the Marxist
political design); 1 RICHARD N. HUNT, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF MARX AND ENGELS 212-13, 227-52
(1974) (describing Marxist agenda to overcome familiar institutions, including the state, the class
system, the professions, divisions of labor, and "capitalist legality").
80. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text
81. On ambivalence toward images in various religions, see supra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text. See also FREEDBERG, supra note 6, at 54 (using "The Myth of Aniconism" as a
chapter title).
82. On the nineteenth-century culmination of the ideal of progress, see Bruce Mazlish,
Progress: A Historical and Critical Perspective, in PROGRESS: FACT OR ILLUSION? 27, 31 (Leo
Marx & Bruce Mazlish eds., 1996).
83. One example among many: Freud recounted treating a married woman for agoraphobia.
The woman reported a dream in which she walked out of her home wearing a hat, which made her
feel safe as she strolled past a group of men. Through discussion, Freud learned that the hat was
shaped like a more splendid version of her husband's scrotum, and concluded that it stood for her
unfulfilled wish for sexual fulfillment from her husband, which would have made her feel safe from
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Thus, a cigar might on rare occasions be just a cigar, but dream images
stand for something else;' prayer to God is projection, or prayer to one-
self." Psychosexual anxiety, as Freud explained it, must be understood
as yet another error of depictionalism. The child acquires misinforma-
tion from the sight of human genitals-most famously that his father,
having a larger penis, will castrate him,86 or that girls are children who
have been maimed as punishment.87 The false, or at least questionable,
teachings of depictionalism contribute to neurosis, a condition that can
be remedied only by rationalist treatments.8
As feminist psychoanalysts and critics have pointed out, Freud's
rationalist approach paradoxically privileged physical signifiers.89 This
paradox is ever-present within rationalism: the center of rationalism is
neither its cogency nor the purity of its abstraction, but its attitude to-
ward the physical object. Just as all religions, however aniconically in-
clined, depend on images, so too will rationalist ideology be caught in
its depictionalist contradictions. Freud advanced the cause of rationalism
not through his own rationality but by enlarging the territory that ra-
tionalism claimed for its own.
Following Freud, the rationalist quest moved to the visual arts.'
Modem art in the twentieth century provided another venue in which
the danger of extramarital temptation. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 247-
48 (A.A. Brill trans., Modem Library 1950) (1900).
84. See LAURENCE PORTER, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS: FREUD'S THEORIES
REVISITED 70 (1987) (likening dreams to "a rebus puzzle"); EM. THORNTON, THE FREUDIAN
FALLACY 216-20 (1984) (detailing dreams of Freud's patient, Dora K., and their interpretation by
Freud).
85. See SIGMUND FREUD, Totem and Taboo, in 13 STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 146-47 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Hogarth Press
1955) (1913). See generally LUDWIG FEUERBACH, THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY (George Eliot
trans., Harper 1957) (1841) (pioneering theory of religion as projection).
86. See ALLEN ESTERSON, SEDUCTIVE MIRAGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE WORK OF
SIGMUND FREUD 58-60 (1993) (recounting case history of "Little Hans" and his father).
87. See SIGMUND FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, in 20 STANDARD EDITION OF
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 75, 123 (James Strachey ed. & trans.,
Hogarth Press 1955) (1926).
88. The "talking cure" understands a host of pathologies in terms of verbal expression. See
Robert L. Russell, Introduction to the Special Section on Multivariate Psychotherapy Process
Research: Structure and Change in the Talking Cure, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYC HOL. 3
(1995). See also R.C. Tallis, Burying Freud, 347 LANCET 669, 670 (1996) (denouncing talking cure
for its mischaracterization of physical organic ailments).
89. See LUCE IRIGARAY, The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry, in SPECULUM OF THE
OTHER WOMAN 13, 50-53 (Gillian C. Gill trans., Comell Univ. Press 1985) (1974) (attacking views of
Freud and Jacques Lacan concerning physical signifiers); GLORIA STEINEM, What If Freud Were
Phyllis?, in MOVING BEYOND WORDS (1994) (satirizing Freud's misogyny). See also J.C. SMITH &
CARLA FERSTMAN, THE CASTRATION OF OEDIPUS: FEMINISM, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND THE WILL
TO POWER 154-58 (1996) (arguing that Freudian symbolism is a device to assert that men, not
women, possess generative power).
90. Writers had long identified a dichotomy between depictionalism and rationalism in the arts.
See generally GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING, LAOCOON: AN ESSAY ON THE LIMITS OF PAINTING
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literal depiction could be seen as a vestige of the unenlightened past. As
the philosopher Arthur Danto argues, modernism began in artists' ef-
forts to replace "cultural boundaries as artistically expressed" with "an
aesthetic universal."'" One prominent figure in this movement was the
impresario Hilla Rebay, founder of what became the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Museum of Art, who asserted passionately that "art was
progressive" and that in the twentieth century "contemporary artists
had rid themselves of the need to reproduce the visual world. Non-
objective painting, in which recognizable objects were completely elimi-
nated, represented the summit of art."' The art genre of which Rebay
spoke became known as "abstract," over the protests of many practi-
tioners who believed they were not abstracting from another source but
instead creating anew.93 Rebay herself preferred the German adjective
gegenstandlos-free of objects-to describe her ideal.94
More overtly than predecessor genres, modernist art also moved
into the rationalist realms of psychology and politics. The spirit of
modernism, Danto writes, urged museumgoers to see paintings not sim-
ply as surfaces "but as instruments for changing one's life." Depic-
tionalism, as always, fought back. Soviet authorities used Socialist
Realism, a depictionalist posture, in resistance to the achievement of
great Russian modernists like Kandinsky and Malevich;9' Nazis called
abstract art degenerate;' audiences and collectors continue to prefer
figurative work.9'
AND POETRY (Edward Allen McCormick trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (1766) (arguing that the visual
and the verbal arts occupy separate and opposite domains). The innovation of modernism was to
ascribe verbal-like traits, perhaps "arguments," to visual objects. For a summary and a refutation of
the philosophical contention that visual images can argue, see David Fleming, Can Pictures Be
Arguments?, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Summer 1996, at 11.
91. Arthur C. Danto, Abstraction, THE NATION, Apr. 8, 1996, at 42 (describing efforts of Van
Gogh, Gauguin, Picasso, and Braque, among others, to incorporate other traditions into Western art
and thereby blur the distinctions between separate cultures). See also REDNER, supra note 6, at 289-
90 (calling Picasso "the foremost exponent of these time-travelers who plundered the museums and
ethnological collections," and also noting eclectic sources behind the music of Stravinsky).
92. JOAN LuKACH, HILLA REBAY: IN SEARCH OF THE SPIRIT IN ARr 82 (1983).
93. See id. at xiii.
94. See id. at xii.
95. Danto, supra note 91, at 44.
96. See id. at 42.
97. "Degenerate art" was not confined to abstraction-the Nazis attacked many other
categories of art, including some figurative work-but twentieth-century abstract pioneers bore the
brunt of this persecution. See 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERTE. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND
THE VISUAL ARTS 259-60 (2d ed. 1987); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA 3-25 (1994).
98. For a jocular and satirical expression of the popular taste for figurative work, see PAINTING
BY NUMBERS: KOMAR & MELAMID'S SCIENTIFIC GUIDE TO ART (Jo Ann Wypijewski ed., 1997)
(offering a figurative painting titled "America's Most Wanted" composed in response to a 102-
question survey of 1001 Americans that asked them what they liked in art); Jan F. van Rooij, The
Jungian Psychological Functions Sensing and Intuition and the Preference for Art, 79 PSYCH OL. REP.
1216 (1996) (reporting psychological experiment that found strong majority preference for figurative
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It would be inaccurate, however, to attribute benign politics to
modernism and rationalism while relegating depictionalism to the Nazis
and the Soviets. Political theorist Harry Redner argues that modernism
"killed itself' by its inevitable alliance with totalitarianism: the attack
on representation in art accompanied an attack on representation in
politics-that is, on "representative democracy and tolerant liberal-
ism;"9 9 the tenet of ipater le bourgeoisie sneered equally at parliaments
and depiction. Redner goes so far as to assert that modernism must take
some responsibility for the fashionable revolutionary violence he asso-
ciates with Wagner, Bakunin, Brecht, Genet, and Foucault."° This stance
may go too far-as I argue below, adherence to depictionalism too can
oppress citizens and arm the state 0'-but Redner's view of the struggle
helpfully illuminates the political conflict between the two modes.
Over the centuries, the representational dialectic has taken many
forms-some of them bloody. From the Egyptian rulers Akenaten and
Tutankhamen, who ordered selected images destroyed, 2 through the
almost infinite number and variety of iconoclastic conflicts barely
skimmed over in this Part, the struggle persists. Depictionalism contin-
ues to withstand the ambition of rationalism to achieve a preemptive,
overarching knowledge by description-in law as well as in art, politics,
social science, and religion. "What is representation?" Redner queries.
"This question has preoccupied philosophers, theologians, epistemolo-
gists, logicians, aestheticians, psychologists, anthropologists, and more
recently semioticians, and many other types of savant .. .. "101 In the
next Part, I move to "other types of savant," focusing on lawyers,
judges, litigants, and legal academics, all of whom participate in the dia-
lectic and underscore its political implications.
II
THE DIALECTIC IN AMERICAN LAW
As expressed in the law of obscenity, forfeiture, and accidents, the
representational dialectic reveals patterns similar to those identified in
Part I. In all three of these areas, and elsewhere, criminal and civil law
doctrines focus on the presence of a physical thing-or, more precisely,
the image of a physical thing"'a-even though the law of crimes and
rather than abstract works of art); cf. Peter Landesman, Reality Bites Back, NEw YoRK, Oct. 2, 1995,
at 35 (describing demonstration at Whitney Museum by artists, critics, and writers protesting "too little
exhibition space for figurative works").
99. REDNER, supra note 6, at 292.
100. See id. at 291-93.
101. See infra Section Iv.A.
102. See FREEDBERG, supra note 6, at 389.
103. REDNER, supra note 6, at 23.
104. I thank Steve Winter for clarifying this distinction to me in conversation.
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torts concerns itself with redress for, and prevention of, harms to human
beings." All three illustrations inform a study of how rationalist re-
forms fail, and show the persistence of depictionalism in those areas of
the law that purport to address behavior rather than images.
A. Obscenity
The American law of obscenity originates with a decision reported
as Sir Charles Sydlyes Case."6 During the Stuart restoration, in 1663, a
crony of the King named Charles Sedley mounted the balcony of a
London tavern and took off his clothes, while "haranguing his audience
with antireligious epithets as he showered them with bottles of urine." ' 7
Having employed force to cause unruliness, Sedley committed a crime
at common law, writes constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe; but the
new common law of obscenity identified Sedley's nakedness, rather
than his actions, as a breach of the peace.0 8 Following this precedent,
English common law created a new crime of obscenity. 9 The tradition
took hold in the United States, where both statutes and common law
went on to proscribe obscenity."0
A study of American judicial decisions, state and federal statutes,
and academic commentary in the two centuries following the importa-
tion of English law shows a focus on material itself, literal and physical
like the body of Sedley, with relative neglect of the harms and incentives
that such material may occasion. Although American doctrine has used
several criteria to identify what is obscene-and, over the last forty
years, to identify what may support a prosecution for obscenity consis-
tent with the First Amendment freedom of speech-these tests all have a
105. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. I note another valuable insight from the
Brooklyn Law School faculty: Bailey Kuklin has commented that rationalism might really be
ascendant here, exploiting images of things for their power to shape assent, or as shorthand for an
array of harms that would otherwise be difficult to catalogue and repair. Accord HARRY M. CLOR,
OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1969) (arguing that too much concern about the harm of
obscenity would hobble legal measures against it). In this view, images are tools rather than ends in
themselves, and rationalism only pretends to cede power to depictionalism. While this assessment of
the dialectic holds some appeal, I believe that depictionalism has more strength than Professor Kuklin
has claimed. In obscenity, for instance, activists disagree profoundly about the harms of certain
works, yet are united by their desire to suppress. If the image were merely a rhetorical and tactical
device-the means to an end-then the end in question would be clearer. See infra notes 155-161 and
accompanying text.
106. 1 Keble 620, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K.B. 1663).
107. LAURENCE -. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 905 (2d ed. 1988).
108. See id.
109. The new crime was only fitfully enforced. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 233-43 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (describing reluctance
of British common lav courts to punish the publication of sexually explicit materials, a tendency that
held strong until the middle of the nineteenth century).
110. Federal statutes were first passed in the nineteenth century. See TmBE, supra note 107, at
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point in common: their preoccupation with the essence of challenged
material."' Insofar as most of the law of obscenity pertains to crimes,' 2
this indifference to social harm seems peculiar."' The domain of crimi-
nal law-or any law-does not readily invite such a metaphysical quest
for the essence of things.
Depictionalist preoccupation with the thing-a book, magazine,
film, videotape, rather than risks, harms, norms, principles, or causal re-
lationships-has provoked rationalist dissent. Judges have questioned
the utility of a law of obscenity that does not much care about direct
danger."4 Scholars have attempted to demonstrate the harmful nature of
obscene works, thereby defending a depictionalist doctrine in rationalist
terms."5 Despite these writings, obscenity law has kept faith with depic-
tionalism. Judicial efforts to hold prosecutors to a harm standard are
located at the margin of doctrine-in dissenting opinions and obscure
lower-court decisions." 6 Writers who present evidence of harm to justify
the legal category of obscenity do not concede that this evidence is
111. For a concise statement of the essence approach, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
481 (1957) ("[Obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.").
112. See FRANKLIN MARK OSANKA & SARA LEE JOHANN, SOURCEBOOK ON PORNOGRAPHY
313 (1989) (noting that "obscenity laws are criminal, not civil, in nature"). The authors go on,
however, to discuss close analogues from civil law. See, e.g., id. at 387-89 (referring to zoning-law
category of "adult" businesses); id. at 395-99 (discussing "indecency" in broadcast law, following
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 (1978)).
113. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Scholars trace the harm requirement to John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty. See CLOR, supra note 105, at 129-35; see also ROBINSON, supra note 23, at
11 (summarizing sources about the harm requirement); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1962)
(providing that consent by a victim is a defense when it vitiates the harm of the offense). For a return
to Mill in the context of pornography, see infra note 152 and accompanying text.
114. For a sampling found in only one case, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957)
(Warren, C.J., concurring) ("It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of the
defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture."); id. at 497 (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (attacking belief that obscenity is a "genus of speech and press," and
"classifiable as poison ivy is among other plants"); id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If we were
certain that impurity of sexual thoughts impelled to action, we would be on less dangerous ground in
punishing the distributors of this sex literature. But it is by no means clear that obscene literature, as so
defined, is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from the community standards,").
115. See CLOR, supra note 105, at 136-74 (discussing social science findings about harm); FINAL
REPORT, supra note 109, at 37, 40-52 (listing harms to health and morals that justify eradication of
pornography); OSANKA & JOHANN, supra note 112, at 130-40 (summarizing claims regarding harms
of pornography, and difficulties of substantiating these claims through clinical research).
116. See supra note 114 (noting judicial asides and dissents in Roth v. United States). The
strongest judicial phrasing of a harm-based obscenity test that I have encountered declares that
material can be deemed legally obscene "only where there is a reasonable and demonstrable cause
to believe that a crime or misdemeanor has been committed or is about to be committed as the
perceptible result of the publication and distribution of the writing in question." Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 156 (1949).
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necessary to the justification." 7 Mainstream obscenity doctrine, in sum,
has generated but not heeded rationalist queries.
Whence depictionalism? For centuries the common law (and also
European civil law)"' lived without any obscenity doctrine-and then
Jacobean England inaugurated a law of obscenity, whose core remains
unchanged. Explanations of origin are obscure. Morris Ernst and Alan
Schwartz have speculated that laws against obscenity arose during the
growth of education and literacy, when powerful 61ites who controlled
society feared that somehow the masses "were less resistant to the cor-
rupting influence of books than the well-to-do.""' 9 Obscenity law, ac-
cording to Ernst and Schwartz, began with a declaration that an entity
like a book has separate properties depending on who consumes it:
You're too common to protect yourself from corruption; my sister is too
pure to protect herself from corruption; I'd just shrug it off. A rational-
ist, by contrast, expects the state to explain how and why obscene entities
harm a "public" that has not been proved to divide along lines of tem-
perament or circumstance.
Seen in terms of the representational dialectic, the chronological
development of obscenity law is notable for its steady rejection of ra-
tionalism. A short history may aid this discussion. The strongest illus-
tration of Ernst and Schwartz's fear-of-common-folk hypothesis is an
English case decided in 1868, The Queen v. Hicklin.20 Hicklin held that
once the essence of challenged material is identified, the court need not
concern itself with "the traditional questions of cause and effect, of
speech and resultant end." ''" This essence of a suppressible work, ac-
cording to Hicklin, is a "tendency ... to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences."'' Following the
117. See CLOR, supra note 105, at 196-97 (arguing that if the law waits until bad acts "have
been done or are about to be done," the level of force necessary to deter these acts will have to be
too draconian).
118. See generally J.G.M. van Dijk, The Function of Fables in Graeco-Roman Romance, 49
MNEMOSYNE 513, 515 (1996) (noting prevalence of "obscenity" in Greek and Roman literature). Ad
hoc censorship, of course, has been practiced in civil-law jurisdictions for many centuries. See
Norman St. John-Stevas, The Church and Censorship, in 'To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT...' 89, 91-105
(John Chandos ed., 1962). But legal doctrines against obscenity-rules of law that bind the sovereign
and offer guidance to the citizenry-have been slow to form, and many governments have a history
of toleration coexisting with their history of censorship. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Prurient Interest
and Human Dignity: Pornography Regulation in West Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH.
J.L REF. 201, 201 (1988) (noting that German law lacks a legal concept of "obscenity"); id. at 232
(describing quantity of publicly displayed female nudity that German citizens tolerate); cf. Robin
Morgan, Planetary Feminism: The Politics of the 21st Century, in SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL 1, 22
(Robin Morgan ed., 1984) (noting that governments of Cuba and Poland have produced pornography
for commercial distribution).
119. MORRIS L. ERsr & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP 18-19 (1964).
120. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
121. Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J 1364, 1368 (1966).
122. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371 (Cockburn, C.J.).
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Hicklin approach, the criminal courts of Massachusetts punished book-
sellers 3 for distributing An American Tragedy'24 and Strange Fruit;
one assistant county prosecutor in Detroit censored more than a hun-
dred books because he feared his daughter might come across passages
in them;'26 the Ninth Circuit approved a customs seizure of the Tropics
novels of Henry Miller'27 because nothing in the books had "the grace
of purity or goodness."'2 8
But starting in the early twentieth century Hicklin had become em-
barrassing to several cosmopolitan, well-lettered federal judges, particu-
larly the notables of New York. Learned Hand, frowning at Hicklin,
wondered in 1913 "whether in the end men will regard that as obscene
which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of innocent ideas"
and whether "we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters
or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to
the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious
few."'29 In United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"' 30 a decision
published twenty years later, Judge John Woolsey repudiated Hicklin on
three points: first, Woolsey wrote, an obscene work must "tend" to
provoke not depravity but rather sexual impulses or thoughts; second,
the work must be examined in its entirety, not read selectively for lubri-
cious passages; and third, the relevant consumer is not a corruptible
child or priapic brute but rather "what the French would call l'homme
moyen sensuel"-the average or reasonable man. In 1956, Jerome
Frank scoffed at Hicklin's prudishness, finding censorship an offense to
the memory of such robust Founders as Jefferson and Franklin.'32
The noted repudiations of Hand, Woolsey, and Frank have received
fair credit for moving obscenity law away from its Victorian mix of
authoritarianism, sexual repression, and condescension toward the lower
orders toward a more sophisticated view of the world. 3  Judges and
policymakers generally agree that most readers are not children; that
123. See Note, supra note 121, at 1369.
124. THEODORE DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1925).
125. LILLIAN EUGENIA SMITH, STRANGE FRUIT (1944).
126. See William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Why Obscene?, in 'To DEPRAVE AND
CORRuPT...' 51, 56 (John Chandos ed., 1962).
127. HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CANCER (1934); HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CAPRICORN
(1939).
128. Note, supra note 121, at 1370 (quoting Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir.
1953)).
129. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.).
130. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd sub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses
by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
131. 5F. Supp. at 184-85.
132. See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring), aff'd,
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
133. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 126, at 54-58; Note, supra note 121, at 1370-73.
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adults should have access to descriptions of sexual relations that use
words, pictures, metaphors, and other necessary means; and that sup-
pression of material deemed obscene can threaten art, politics, science,
and indeed all of culture. When the Supreme Court crushed Hicklin with
the declaration in Roth v. United States that the new constitutional test
for obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest,"'"M it owed a debt to Hand, Woolsey,
and Frank that the Brennan opinion for the Court did not fully ac-
knowledge.
Yet of the progress-minded jurists from New York, only Frank had
expressed any skepticism about the search for essence. 35 Hand wanted
merely to liberalize the search; Woolsey had no interest in constitutional
tests. Surely, though, if the First Amendment limits the regulation of
obscenity-as the Supreme Court insisted in Roth and its sequelae'36 -
then obscene works must be "speech," albeit speech of a dubious kind,
and free speech law generally asserts that only danger can justify sup-
pression. Rejecting this precept, the search for essence follows an
"exclusion" approach: courts consider whether a work by its inherent
nature contains a property that alone justifies excluding it from First
Amendment protection. When courts find this essence, they must permit
the state to suppress. 37 This outlook retains the curious and unarticu-
lated premise that a thing has a nature.
Ernst and Schwartz paraphrase this point as a constitutional law
lament. In determining whether a work is obscene, they complain,
we need not give it the benefit of the tests and standards that are
required to be applied to the other kinds of speech-Holmes's
"clear and present danger" or the Brandeis variant-all of
134. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1957).
135. See 237 F.2d at 801-06 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring). See also id. at 811 (noting that
one obvious effect of erotic material is the arousal of desire, which is necessary for the continuation
of the human race and therefore valuable to the state).
136. The Roth test was reformulated in later decisions. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (referring to lack of "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value"); A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 418 (1966) (using the phrase "utterly without redeeming social value"); see also Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (limiting the range of permissible local variation within
"contemporary community standards").
137. As a student commentator elaborates, the "exclusion" approach-the insistence that certain
verbal expressions are not speech for purposes of First Amendment protection-may be traced to
Zechariah Chafee's Free Speech in the United States. See Note, supra note 121, at 1366-69. "The
only sound explanation of the punishment of obscenity and profanity," wrote Chafee, "is that the
words are criminal, not because of the ideas they communicate, but like acts because of their
immediate consequences to the five senses." Id. at 1367 n.19 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149-50 (1941)). Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY
VORDS 17 (1993) (insisting that pornography is not speech but rather a device that aids
masturbation).
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which require some proof of causal relation to antisocial behav-
ior. In other words, we first decide whether some writing is ob-
scene and then we say that because it is obscene it is not entitled
to any of the tests used to judge whether other kinds of writings
are entitled to the protection of the Constitution.'38
A rationalist contrast, sketched out by Harry Kalven, Jr. to inaugu-
rate the new Supreme Court Review,'39 likely reached several Justices of
the Supreme Court in the years following Roth. Having no particular
investment in rationalism, Kalven appeared more baffled by depiction-
alism than hostile to it. "Toward what dangers was obscenity legislation
directed?""' he queried in 1960, soon after the Supreme Court got into
the business of constitutionalizing obscenity disputes. Had Kalven
stopped short of asserting that if there are no dangers, there ought to be
no crime.
"Analysis," continued Kalven in response to his rhetorical ques-
tion, "reveals four possible evils: (1) the incitement to antisocial sexual
conduct; (2) psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery;
(3) the arousing of feelings of disgust and revulsion; and (4) the advo-
cacy of improper sexual values. All present difficulties.'' They do
indeed. Evil 1 on the Kalven list, as I mentioned, lay virtually unex-
amined. Evil 2 seems to mean tumescence-a physical expression that a
reader enjoys while consuming sexually explicit materials. 142 Putting
aside the question of whether "psychological excitement" is one of the
"evils" that warrant application of the criminal law, Evil 2 is inconsis-
tent with Evil 3, which declares that obscenity turns a man off rather
than on: Kalven refers to causation of harm with the word "arousing"
but what obscenity causes, according to Evil 3, is "disgust and revul-
sion" rather than an erection. The words "advocacy" and "improper"
in Evil 4 beg all the questions on the table. In what sense do films and
pictorials advocate?' What results from such advocacy? Whose sexual
values are proper?
Following Roth and the Kalven article, Supreme Court case law
cleared up some of this doubt by explaining "value" in terms of social
138. ER',sT & SCHWARTZ, supra note 119, at205.
139. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
140. Id. at 3-4.
141. Id. Kalven adds, "Presumably what is meant is a physiological (sexual) response to a
picture or the written word. And one suspects that the real fear is one that everyone, except Anthony
Comstock, has been too reticent to mention, the fear of masturbation." Id. at 4 n.21.
142. I assume Kalven had a male reader in mind; his diction supports that inference. But a
contemporary to The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity contended that "one presumed motive for
censorship" is the male desire to "protect" female readers from arousal that might weaken their
resistance to seducers. See ERNsT & SCHWARTZ, supra note 119, at 249.
143. Cf. Fleming, supra note 90, at 11 (contending that images cannot argue, in part because no
negation of their "argument" is possible).
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utility'" and identifying, albeit vaguely, an affronted "community" that
consists of more than ignorant prudes. 45 Another post-Roth case forged
the concept of "pandering," a rationalist notion that finds materials that
are not inherently obscene to become obscene through the manner in
which purveyors distribute them.'46 And the Court has suggested that the
"serious value" criterion, rendering a work protected, is a tacit state-
ment about causality: serious value redeems, obscenity debases. 47 Yet
obscenity law has never grappled with the causal questions that Justice
Harlan, Judge Frank, Professor Kalven and other writers have raised.4 '
Instead it continues to cling to "essence" and "exclusion": Because
obscenity is what it is, it may be regulated without any attention to cause
and effect.
49
Accordingly, one finds in the pornography debate-the site of
most contemporary disputes about obscenity-a "morality" justifica-
tion of censorship that conflicts famously with "the feminist perspec-
tive;"'5 the familiar emphasis on essence appears on both sides of this
conflict. Religious leaders have attacked pornography with claims that it
causes harm to the spirit (to them pornography "arrests personal devel-
opment," "distorts the beauty and goodness of human love," and
"erodes the general moral fiber") reminiscent of all that John Stuart
Mill thought was none of the business of a liberal state.'52 Worried about
the radical-right power to silence and oppress women, anti-pornography
feminists struggle to look at pornography in a way that affirms the
144. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
145. See id. at 30-32 (noting relative sophistication of the "community" in Las Vegas and New
York); see also OSANKA & JOHANN, supra note 112, at 319 (surveying application of "community
standards").
146. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 80-84 (1976) (discussing Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)).
147. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63-64 (1973).
148. One writer indicates that the constitutionalization of obscenity law did not create an
opportunity for rationalist influence: she describes the United States Constitution as "moralist" rather
than "causalist;" in other words, the Constitution prefers absolutist statements to beneficial
consequences. See Christie Davies, How Our Rulers Argue About Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND
OBSCENITY 9, 17-22 (Rajeev Dhavan & Christie Davies eds., 1978).
149. "We will permit what we will permit," explained Zechariah Chafee. See Lockhart &
McClure, supra note 126, at 70.
150. See OSANKA & JOHANN, supra note 112, at 255-65. On divisions within "the feminist
perspective," see id. at 266-84.
151. Id. at 258.
152. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., Library of Liberal Arts
1956) (1859) ("[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant."). Contemporary religious leaders do advert to the harmful effects
of pornography, yet these arguments are generally placed as subordinate to a larger complaint about
spiritual deterioration. See Varda Burstyn, Introduction, in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 1, 1-3
(Varda Burstyn ed., 1985); OSANKA & JOHANN, supra note 112, at 258-62.
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splendor of its contrast, "erotica."'53 These overlapping yet contrary
political agendas have together achieved some success in increasing
public disapproval of pornography,"5 but in their strongly divergent
agendas they demonstrate the gap between rationalist and depictionalist
versions of obscenity law. A rationalist pornography law-absent in the
United States and everywhere else-would focus first on a harm, and
then identify those objects that conduce to it. The depictionalist version
that prevails instead agrees that a thing is pornographic; activists use this
essence only later to establish the harm of their choice.
One can observe the dialectic at work by reviewing endorsements
of suppressing obscenity and pornography. Roman Catholic canon law
has denounced obscenity as part of a wider condemnation of "heretical
and schismatical books, books supporting divorce, dueling, suicide, or
which evoke spirits, advocate magic, etc." 5I Harry Clor and Ernest van
den Haag maintain that censorship is necessary to respect continuity,
tradition, and stabilizing forces in society.'56 Andrea Dworkin condemns
pornography because, she says, pornography begets murder, torture,
racist violence, harassment of women and children, and forced prostitu-
tion.57 The psychiatrist Park Dietz claims that pornography ought to be
suppressed because it teaches its consumers "sexual disinformation. '
Henry Hudson, chairman of the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography, has suggested that laws against pornography would aid
the right side of the battle between federal law enforcement and organ-
ized crime.5 9 A German commentator professes his concern that
153. Although a distinction between the two cannot be drawn with precision, "erotica" seems to
connote nonviolence, egalitarian participation, female agency, and a cheerful atmosphere: sexual
encounters seen as playful or joyous or tender, without overt aggression or dominance by one
participant over another. The most famous expression of this contrast is GLORIA STEINEM, Erotica vs.
Pornography, in OUTRAGEOUS AcTs AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 219 (1983).
154. See Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L REv. 169, 185-86
(1996) (noting gains of anti-pornography effort in the battle over public opinion). For a summary of
disputes among feminists about working in alliance with right-wing moralists, see KATHARINE T.
BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW 654-55 (2d ed. 1998).
155. St. John-Stevas, supra note 118, at 106-07.
156. See CLOR, supra note 105, passim; Ernest van den Haag, Quia Ineptum, in 'To DEPRAVE
AND CORRUPT...' 111 (John Chandos ed., 1962). Clor works from the perspective of political theory,
finding public morality affirmed in the condemnation of obscenity, see CLOR, supra note 105, at 48-
61; van den Haag works eclectically, referring to sociology and anthropology, see van den Haag,
supra, at 113-14, as well as psychoanalytic theory: to him censorship is a compromise "between the
original wish to indulge infantile, anal, oral and ultimately all sexual desires, and the later wish to
control them." Id. at 122.
157. See Andrea Dworkin, Pornography Is a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 55, 56-57 (1988).
158. Among this "disinformation" are the notions that sex never coexists with love or marriage
or procreation, and that sexual encounters routinely include fetishistic costumes, bizarre body
piercings, extravaginal ejaculation, and total strangers or blood relatives as partners. See FINAL
REPORT, supra note 109, at 42-44.
159. See id. at 32.
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pornography jeopardizes human dignity." These divergent assertions
about harm all purport to address the same kind of material.
Of course, everybody could be right: obscene materials might
threaten both traditional gender boundaries and the liberation of
women; they might repulse and arouse; they might foster mechanical
and imitative sexual practices and teach deviance; they might advocate
"improper sexual values"'61 and thereby raise a threat that the state
could regulate consistent with the First Amendment and not be words at
all, out of the range of First Amendment protection. Or, alternatively,
some assertions about the causation of harm could be right and others
wrong. The merits of various rationalist arguments do not concern us
here. For purposes of identifying a representational dialectic in obscen-
ity law, we need note only the proliferation of conflicting causal propo-
sitions that swirl around one point: obscenity within a thing per se
defines and justifies an area of criminal-law regulation. Criminal law
contains no exception to the harm requirement as vast as this triumph of
depictionalism.
B. Forfeiture
At an oral argument in November 1995, Justice Stephen Breyer
flew the rationalist flag. "What policy does it serve? What purpose does
it serve? What's the theory... " he demanded of Larry Roberts, 62 an
assistant state's attorney arguing for the respondent in Bennis v.
Michigan.63 At issue in Bennis was civil asset forfeiture. Tina Bennis
had challenged a Michigan forfeiture statute as unconstitutional on the
ground that it lacked an innocent owner defense, and Justice Breyer
wanted Michigan to justify its power to punish an "innocent" with the
forfeiture of her asset, in this case a clunky Pontiac worth less than
$600.'64
The record shows that, consistent with the history of the dialectic,
Roberts responded passively. He did not defend depictionalism or
160. See Reimann, supra note 118, at 226.
161. See Kalven, supra note 139, at 4.
162. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Nov. 29, 1995, at 51, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442
(1996) (No. 94-8729), available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 712350.
163. 516 U.S. 442(1996).
164. John Bennis had been arrested after a police officer observed him engaged in a sex act
with a prostitute in the Pontiac; his wife Tina Bennis, a homemaker, had bought the automobile using
earnings from baby sitting. Husband and wife owned the Pontiac jointly. The arrest took place in a
Detroit neighborhood notorious for street prostitution paid for by suburbanites like Mr. Bennis.
Pursuant to an abatement statute, Michigan authorities seized the Pontiac. See Michigan ex rel.
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Mich. 1994). A trial judge approved
the forfeiture despite the absence of proof that Tina Bennis had known about her husband's detour on
the way home from work. See id. at 486. The Michigan Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court both permitted the forfeiture to stand.
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engage his rationalist critic in an argument that questioned the need for
a "policy" or "purpose.""5 Also consistent with this history, depic-
tionalism survived the attack-inconclusively, as usual, and by a narrow
margin. I6 Innocent propertyholders may continue to suffer detriment
from government officials without the safeguards of constitutional
criminal procedure. Civil asset forfeiture, the doctrine that focuses on
things as distinct from their owners, endures as an absolute embarrass-
ment to rationalism. 167
Forfeiture law permits the government to take property in a civil
proceeding.168 State forfeiture laws abound, 169 and law enforcement task
forces have written model acts, 70 but both commentary and data-
gathering have focused on the comprehensive set of federal civil for-
feiture laws and federal case law, 71  and my discussion relies on this
familiar record. As many commentators have noted, the civil-law status
of most asset forfeiture gives the government several procedural
165. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Wife's Appeal over Property Forfeiture, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at B13 (reporting that Roberts "struggled to frame an answer").
166. Both the Supreme Court and Michigan Supreme Court decisions would have come out in
favor of Tina Bennis if just one vote had been different. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 passim
(1996) (expressing the Justices' sentiment that this case was very close).
167. See HYDE, supra note 17, at 1 (asserting that current forfeiture law was "resurrected, like
some jurisprudential Frankenstein monster, from the dark recesses of past centuries"); id. at 71
(describing root of forfeiture as "a ridiculous legal fiction"); Leslie A. Hakala, Book Note, Opposing
Forfeiture, 106 YALE LJ. 1319, 1320 (1997) (calling origins of forfeiture "senseless" and
"irrational"); Forfeiting Fairness, supra note 38, at A30 (warning that unprincipled forfeiture law
"invites cynicism" about the legal system).
168. Property can also be forfeited through criminal procedures. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)
(1994) (allowing for forfeiture of "substitute property" equivalent in value to forfeitable property);
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1153, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-13 (amending RICO
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, to provide for pretrial restraint of assets, which are later subject to
forfeiture). For an analysis of federal criminal forfeiture law, see Terrance G. Reed, On the
Importance of Being Civil: Constitutional Limitations on Civil Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L REV. 255,
264-68 (1994).
169. See, e.g., supra note 164 (discussing Michigan statute); A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-253,
13-2314(N), 13-4301-4315 (West 1995) (expanding the reach of civil forfeiture); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
1310(4) (McKinney 1997) (providing for forfeiture of "instrumentality of a crime"). All states except
Iowa and Vermont have forfeiture laws. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The
Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 35, 110 n.285 (1998).
170. See COMMISSION FORFEITURE REFORM AcT (President's Comm'n on Model State Drug
Laws 1993); MODEL ASSET FORFEITURE ACT (1991).
171. Federal forfeiture began in 1789, with the authorization to seize ships and cargo for
customs laws violations. See George Fishman, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: The Agenda Before
Congress, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L REv. 121, 122 (1994). Long before the Emancipation Proclamation,
federal law provided for the forfeiture of certain slave ships. See Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat.
347. Federal forfeiture law moved into drug trafficking with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 408,413, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1994)). For an overview of federal civil forfeiture law, see 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL Div., ASSET FORFEITURE OFFICE, FORFEITURES (1984). Civil asset
forfeiture is big business for the United States government: net deposits in the Asset Forfeiture Fund
totaled $555.7 million in 1993, causing a House Judiciary Committee lawyer to remark in print that
"Congress is not going to get rid of a $500 million cash cow." Fishman, supra, at 124, 137.
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advantages vis-h-vis a putative wrongdoer. First, the seizure provides the
government with in rem jurisdiction, useful in cases where the wrong-
doer is not subject to in personam jurisdiction."' Of more value to the
government are rules about the burden of proof. Property may be
seized on "probable cause" that it is "guilty;"173 the owner who wants
his property back later has the burden to prove that it is "innocent,"
under a more stringent preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.174 The
civil nature of forfeiture also means that double-jeopardy, due-process,
and excessive-fines constitutional protections for property owners apply
shakily, if at all,75 and collateral estoppel doctrine does not preclude
forfeiture even after the owner is acquitted of the crime in question. 76
Moreover, as Tina Bennis learned and as Congressman Hyde has docu-
mented, innocent owners often lose their property to civil asset forfei-
ture.'77
Some commentators divide property subject to civil forfeiture into
three categories-"contraband," "proceeds," and "instrumentali-
ties"-with the implication that these three descriptions each convey a
"taint" that distinguishes things as forfeitable.' The labels indicate
172. See The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289 (1815) (Story, J.). But see Reed v. The Yaka,
373 U.S. 410,419 n.2 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (decrying in rem liability without in personam
liability as "a gross misapplication of a fiction").
173. See 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES J 11.01 at 11-
10 (1998); see also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827) (Story, J.) (noting that in admiralty
forfeiture, "the offense is attached primarily to the thing"). Little evidence is necessary. For example,
hearsay can support a forfeiture. See United States v. $129,727, 129 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. 4492 South Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. No. 14-
I, Estate St. John, 899 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. V.I. 1995).
174. See Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified?, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L REV.
311, 313 (1994) (discussing the allocations of burdens of proof).
175. Compare Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (applying Double Jeopardy Clause to
some forfeitures) with United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-83 (1996) (holding that forfeiture is
not a second punishment); compare Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304-06 (1871)
(upholding civil forfeiture of property belonging to Confederate rebels, and rejecting Due Process
challenge) with United States v. $49,576 U.S. Currency, 116 F.3d 425,428 (9th Cir. 1997) (raising due
process concern in dicta). On excessive fines, see United States v. 6040 Wentworth Ave. S., 123 F.3d
685, 687-89 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing uncertainty and conflicting legal standards). In a recent 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court struck down one forfeiture as an excessive fine. See United States v.
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998). Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas distinguished the forfeiture
of cash, at issue in Bajakajian, from the forfeiture of a tangible object that might have been an
"instrumentality." Id. at 2036 n.9.
176. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 357-66 (1984).
177. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996); LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY at x (1996). Congressman Hyde writes that eighty percent of persons who
lose property pursuant to civil forfeiture are never charged with a crime. See HYDE, supra note 17, at
61-64.
178. Cheh, supra note 12, at 14; Eric N. Bergquist, Note, Statutory In Rem Forfeiture, the
Punishment of Innocent Owners and the Excessive Fines Clause: An Analysis of Bennis v. Michigan,
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 76 NEB. L REv. 155, 157 (1997). The principal distinction between civil
forfeiture and criminal forfeiture is that civil forfeiture is "traditionally limited to property actually
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rationalist bases for forfeiture. "Contraband," such as drugs or coun-
terfeit currency, can be linked to public health and morals; the adage
that a man should not profit from his own wrong explains
"proceeds." '79 Mary Cheh pauses on "instrumentalities," however,
which she defines as "properties that are used, or intended for use, to
commit or facilitate a crime." '  This category seems unbounded-the
Bennis Pontiac, a condominium, a tract of land-and Professor Cheh
finds nothing in "instrumentalities" law to stop the forfeiture of
"whole neighborhoods where crime flourishes" and the confiscation of
"every tenth house" wherever law enforcers want to encourage moni-
toring by citizen informants.'
Because of its stubborn resistance to rationalist demands like those
of Justice Breyer, forfeiture stands as an extraordinary illustration of
depictionalist perseverance. As one might expect, the provocative topic
has inspired a host of commentary. A particular favorite of student
notewriters,5 2 forfeiture law has also earned the ire of commentators in-
terested in the boundary between civil and criminal law,I"3 libertarians
affiliated with the Cato Institute," the criminal defense bar,' and
used to violate the law, whereas criminal forfeitures can include lawfully acquired and used
property." Reed, supra note 168, at 268.
179. See Cheh, supra note 12, at 14-15. As Ronald Dworkin has pointed out, "[n]o man may
profit from his own wrong" is not a true legal rule. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. Cm. L REv. 14, 26 (1967) (noting exceptions to the "rule" such as adverse possession).
180. Cheh, supra note 12, at 14. Justice Stevens had the same problem with "instrumentalities" in
Bennis. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 460-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Cheh, supra note 12, at 17.
182. Among dozens of student writings in recent years, see Michael F. Alessio, Comment, From
Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 48
SMU L. REv. 429 (1995); Alejandro Caffarelli, Note, Civil Forfeiture Hits Home: A Critical Analysis
of United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1447 (1995); Taline Festekjian, Note, Civil
Forfeiture and the Status of Innocent Owners After Bennis v. Michigan, 37 B.C. L REv. 713 (1996);
Erik Grant Luna, Note, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis Court's Constitutional House of Cards,
49 STAN. L REv. 409 (1997); Stacy J. Pollock, Note, Proportionality in Civil Forfeiture: Toward a
Remedial Solution, 62 GEO. WASH. L REv. 456 (1994).
183. See Cheh, supra note 12; Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); Sean G. Alexander, Note, The Civil-Criminal Distinction
in Ohio's Forfeiture Laws, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1463 (1993); Robert E. Edwards, Comment, Forfeitures-
Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 191 (1970); Janeice T. Martin, Note, Final Jeopardy: Merging the
Civil and Criminal Rounds in the Punishment Game, 46 FLA. L REv. 661, 663 (1995).
184. See TERRANCE G. REED, AMERICAN FORFEITURE LAW: PROPERTY OWNERS MEET THE
PROSECUTOR (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 179, Sept. 29, 1992); Pilon, supra note 174; Reed, supra
note 168.
185. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 56 (1997) (statement of Gerald B. Lefcourt,
President-Elect, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); Brief Amicus Curiae of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner, Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729), available in Lexis, 1994 U.S. Briefs 8729.
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members of Congress, notably Henry Hyde. l"' Much of what these peo-
ple say and write falls loosely in the rationalist camp. Critics contend
that forfeiture, a vestige of magical thinking and pre-scientific blame of
the inanimate, cannot be reconciled with American traditions of pun-
ishing only wrongful conduct and enforcing procedural guarantees for
individuals. Amid this uniformity, a small number of commentators at-
tempt to deal "rationally" with forfeiture law, rather than merely label
it irrational. As we will see, commentators who address civil asset forfei-
ture in rationalist terms ultimately emphasize its depictionalist essence.
One may dispense quickly with most published defenses of the civil
forfeiture status quo, as they amount to little more than a brief for law
enforcement prerogatives.'87 Testifying in 1997 before the House
Judiciary Committee, Stefan Cassella of the U.S. Justice Department re-
counted that forfeiture has effected desirable ends: 88 if not for forfei-
ture, one criminal might have thwarted a restitution order by depleting
his savings; another miscreant impacted by Justice Department forfei-
ture had been hiding, unextraditable, in Colombia; a third man, if given
the long leash of due process, would have been able to move his money
into a foreign bank account.'89 But seizure is not the same as forfei-
ture;190 and the Cassella examples can serve to defend only seizure. The
remainder of Cassella's case for civil forfeiture, even more anecdotal,
describes a happy alchemy: By the magic of forfeiture, marijuana
farms turn into bucolic retreats for troubled city children; crack houses
become residences for poor women undergoing drug treatment; and
vacant lots held by crooked banks bloom into parkland.91 Cassella stops
short of suggesting that, in the utilitarian paradise of current forfeiture
law, my house might make a nice little outbuilding for the Internal
Revenue Service, although nothing in his argument would preclude such
186. See HYDE, supra note 17; see also Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, H.R. 3347, 103d Cong.
(1993) (introduced by Congressman John Conyers).
187. See, e.g., Terrence P. Farley, Asset Forfeiture Reform: A Law Enforcement Response, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. R v. 149, 161 (1994) (describing satisfaction with forfeiture laws within the law
enforcement community); see also HYDE, supra note 17, at 10 (quoting prosecutors' praises of
forfeiture); LEvy, supra note 177, at 149-59 (arguing that law enforcers support forfeiture because
they have a financial stake in it).
188. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 61 (1997) (statement of Stefan D. Cassella,
Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Department of Justice, Criminal
Division) [hereinafter Cassella, Statement].
189. See id.; see also Stefan D. Cassella, Establishing Probable Cause for Forfeiture in Federal
Money Laundering Cases, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 163, 173 (1994) (arguing that courts can determine
whether money was "involved in" illegal transactions). But see Andrew Schneider & Mary P.
Flaherty, Drugs Contaminate Nearly All the Money in America, PTT. PRESs, Aug. 12, 1991, at A6
(stating that 96% of U.S. currency in circulation has been involved in illegal drug transactions).
190. See Pilon, supra note 174, at 332.
191. See Cassella, Statement, supra note 188.
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a forfeiture.'92 It is true, as Mary Cheh has conceded, that a few physical
entities, such as auto "chop shops," have a presence distinct from their
owners-almost a kind of mens rea in themselves-and forfeiture of
such places can discourage confederates from carrying on criminal ac-
tivities there after the owners go to prison. 93 But rationalism is still un-
satisfied: How can the odd anecdote or exception support a body of law
that insists on the criminality and moral taint of things?'94
In contrast to the cheerful rationalism that Cassella expresses-
forfeiture is good because it increases aggregate happiness-libertarians
Donald Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard propound a dark, cynical ration-
alism. To Boudreaux and Pritchard, the law of civil forfeiture is such
thoroughgoing nonsense that only an extreme form of public choice
analysis-a rationalist device-can explain it. Boudreaux and Pritchard
see forfeiture as a project that law enforcement authorities advance to
promote their self-interest. In the American political arena, the ill-
organized population at risk of having goods forfeited can never prevail
against powerful government officials.'96 Officialdom wants to amass
forfeited goods and cash because it can use their value to augment law
enforcement budgets.' 97 This revenue escapes attention in the political
process, and citizens end up with the big-government bureaucracy they
might well despise if they understood it.'
The consequences, as Boudreaux and Pritchard explain, are unfor-
tunate. For example, law-abiding residential tenants pay for forfeiture in
higher rent because rational landlords who know that their properties
are vulnerable to forfeiture will pass on these expected costs to lessees. 199
As for law enforcement, officials invest too much effort in crimes where
the chance of significant forfeiture is high, and too little where it is low.
Opinion polls report that Americans want vigorous enforcement of laws
192. Cf. HYDE, supra note 17, at 7 (speculating that the House of Representatives post office
might be forfeitable because of drug dealing there).
193. See Cheh, supra note 12, at 16.
194. See generally Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931)
(calling forfeited property "guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate
and insentient").
195. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons
from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79 (1996).
196. See id. at 85-86.
197. See id. at 84-85; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 63-64 n.103 (quoting
directives from Justice Department supervisors ordering more forfeiture); Naftali Bendavid, Asset
Forfeiture, Once Sacrosanct, Now Appears Ripe for Reform, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 1
(describing "marching orders" at Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Section: "Forfeit, forfeit,
forfeit. Get money, get money, get money").
198. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 195, at 85-86; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra
note 169, at 98-99 (arguing that the war on drugs is stoked by law enforcers' greed and public
incomprehension).
199. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 195, at 85-86 & n.16.
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that threaten nonconsenting parties-especially violence and fraud-but
law enforcers would rather pursue drug traffickers, who can deliver
"personal benefits for the agents."' Drug kingpins buy their way out
of incarceration through forfeiture-based plea bargaining, while impov-
erished low-level "mules" go to prison." Incentives for drug-law vio-
lators who choose among criminal alternatives are equally pernicious.
Why deal in marijuana when you can lose your automobile, no more
and no less, for the more lucrative crack cocaine?2 2 Add another fact-
the tendency of high-priced drugs to increase violent behavior among
those who buy and sell them-and it becomes likely that forfeiture also
increases the problem of violent crimes committed without calcula-
tion?°3
Boudreaux and Pritchard extend their rationalism into their study
of the history of forfeiture. Many writers have been taken with such ar-
cana as the biblical commandment to kill a goring ox as a wrongdoer,2"
the ancient Greek practice of putting inanimate objects on trial, 5 and
especially deodand, the oldest method of forfeiture and the only one
under English law that did not require conviction of the owner? 6 Under
deodand, an instrument that caused the death of a person was forfeited
to the Crown. 7 Boudreaux and Pritchard say deodand is silly: "the
superstition that inanimate objects can be culpable for harming humans
has been discarded with the advance of science." ' 8 Consistent with this
brisk rationalism, the authors go on to say that deodand historically
amounted to a minor share of the English law of in rem forfeiture; the
basic, functional justification for in rem forfeiture was the admiralty
200. Id. at 91; see also Cheh, supra note 12, at 43 (noting that along the 1-95 drug corridor in
Florida, drug agents choose to stop southbound vehicles in the belief that they contain forfeitable
cash, while choosing to ignore northbound vehicles in the belief that they contain drugs, of no value to
the agents).
201. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 71-73.
202. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 195, at 92,200.
203. See id.
204. See Exodus 21:28 (THE SoNcINo CHUMASH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES WITH
HAPHTAROTH, A. Cohen ed., The Soncino Press 1947); Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some
Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty, 46 TEn. L.Q. 169 (1973).
205. See Marilyn A. Katz, Ox-Slaughter and Goring Oxen: Homicide, Animal Sacrifice and
Judicial Process, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 269-70 (1992).
206. See HOLMES, supra note 34, at 24-25 (discussing deodand); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra
note 195, at 93.
207. The Supreme Court associated deodand with forfeiture. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974). For references to deodand in the forfeiture
literature, see Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 195, at 94; Finkelstein, supra note 204, at 170; Luna,
supra note 182, at 417; James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L REv. 768, 771 (1977).
208. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 195, at 95.
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problem of absent owners, and forfeiture should therefore be limited
primarily to situations where the wrongdoer cannot be reached." 9
The analysis is masterful. In the best rationalist tradition,
Boudreaux and Pritchard expose the perversity of civil asset forfeiture.
Equally consistent with the dialectical tradition, however, they cannot
defeat depictionalism, because they cannot account for the appeal of
"superstition" within doctrine. Collective action problems help explain
why the forfeited-upon do not unite to advance their interests, but do
not explain why courts, legislators, and the public all accept this bureau-
cratic rent-seeking. Notwithstanding the cries about senselessness, for-
feiture must somehow make sense. Understanding forfeiture depends on
the depictionalist belief that things are not exactly commensurable with
rationalist devices like money and punishment.
Another rationalist engagement with forfeiture law-an attempt at
economic analysis of civil asset forfeiture-unintentionally illustrates
the incompatibility of forfeiture and rationalism."0 The student com-
mentator Catherine Cerna argues that because forfeiture takes valued
property away from an owner, it should be considered a punishment,
even though it falls under civil law2 ' and even though the Supreme
Court has stopped short of endorsing this proposition.21 2 When seen as a
punishment, forfeiture must be proportionate to the harm it seeks to ad-
dress. Using an "external cost index," therefore, Cerna proposes a for-
mula to calculate the maximum dollar amount that can be forfeited for
a particular crime. The formula includes the magnitude of the crime, the
probability of conviction, and the per capita cost of enforcement, as well
as a multiple for the sake of deterrence. 3
Ignoring as it does the entire set of existing criminal sanctions
while insisting that forfeiture is a criminal sanction, this proposal ap-
pears peculiar. Cerna concedes that her version of forfeiture adds an
extra measure of penalty to those wrongdoers who happen to have
209. See id. at 119.
210. See Catherine Cerna, Note, Economic Theory Applied to Civil Forfeiture: Efficiency atnd
Deterrence Through Reallocation of External Costs, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1939 (1995).
211. See id. at 1939-43, 1950-54.
212. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding, by a divided Court, that a rule of
proportionality limited the quantity of forfeiture that could be imposed, thus suggesting, but not
holding, that in rem forfeiture implicates constitutional guarantees of due process and safeguards
against double jeopardy and excessive fines); see also supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
213. Cerna gives two hard-numbers examples. A Chicago tavern worth $126,000 was once
forfeited for the sake of a crime involving three kilograms of cocaine. See 4114 West North Avenue,
1990 WL 207377. Crunching her numbers, Cerna arrives at a maximum forfeitable amount of
$62,386.38. See Cema, supra note 210, at 1962. In another case, one married couple lost their house
because of 7.5 grams of marijuana growing in the garden. See United States v. Cleveland Avenue,
799 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Cerna calculates that the maximum forfeitable amount should
have been $4,469.47. See Cerna, supra note 210, at 1962.
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known assets. 2 14 Although the forfeited-upon would be better off in a
Cema regime than they are now, because they would forfeit less, Cema
dodges the task of making sense of forfeiture law in the context of
criminal punishment. But the more basic deficiency of the proposal is
found in two of its premises. Cema believes that things equal money
and money equals things, a claim that even economists have dis-
proved.2 1 She maintains that fines and forfeiture are the same;216 inex-
plicably, however, criminal procedure safeguards apply to the former
and not the latter. One cannot imagine any court, legislature, law en-
forcement agency, or group of citizens that would accept Cema's pro-
posal. This rejection originates not only in political biases of the debate
that Boudreaux and Pritchard discuss,27 but in the unintelligibility of
forfeiture when policymakers deem tangible property exactly equivalent
to money.
By way of conclusion, some concessions to the rationalist literature
on forfeiture are in order. Forfeiture has yielded utilitarian advantages,
as Cassella argues. Public choice theory, well detailed by Boudreaux and
Pritchard, explains the powerful incentives that help to keep current
doctrine in place. Cema's formulations inform the question of what is at
stake when assets are forfeited: her claim that things equal money and
money equals things may be misguided, as I have argued; but it is in
partial measure quite true, as is demonstrated by endowment-effects ex-
periments in the laboratory28 and auctions, markets, real property tax
assessments, "book values" for used automobiles, and the like in life.
Again, I stress dialectic rather than defeat. Much of forfeiture is amena-
ble to rationalist explanation. The doctrine is depictionalist only in part
and, consistent with the structure of a dialectic, rationalism exerts an on-
going and shifting influence on forfeiture law. Rationalist treatments of
forfeiture law, in sum, shed light on a baffling comer of doctrine with-
out fully explaining its refusal to conform to rationalism.
214. See Cema, supra note 210, at 1955.
215. See, e.g., Kalmeman et al., supra note 28, at 1327 (naming this lack of equivalence "the
endowment effect").
216. See Cema, supra note 210, at 1940. But see United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971) (lending some support to Cema's views: "Where is no difference between
a man who 'forfeits' $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man
who pays a 'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct"). When the forfeited
thing is not money but a thing accessible to sensory depiction, however, cases come out differently.
See United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998); supra text accompanying note 175.
217. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 28 (demonstrating students' partial willingness to trade tokens, cash, and
coffee mugs in a market).
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C. Accident Law
A final illustration of the representational dialectic emerges from
accident law, which makes distinctions based on the entity harmed. 21 9
This focus on the image of a body or a thing-as a recipient or inflicter
of injury-is a curious exception within tort law, whose rationalist com-
mitments have been noted. " Tort law is dominated by negligence, 2
and negligence illustrates rationalism more clearly, perhaps, than any
other legal doctrine.
Whereas depictionalism focuses on separate images, rationalism
embraces unifying concepts;222 and as a rationalist device, negligence
brings together an almost infinite array of images and behaviors. Courts
redress the harms caused by wrongful adoption, deficient driving, edu-
cational malpractice, accountants' liability, slip-and-fall accidents,
mixed-up pharmaceutical prescriptions, crossed telegraph messages, in-
adequate maintenance of residential buildings, careless entrustment of
automobiles or weapons to third parties, mental health professionals'
failure to warn third parties that their patients intend to do them harm,
and other types of injuries under this unifying rubric. With its steady
recourse to "prudence" and "due care," embodied in the reasonable
man or person, negligence insists that accidents are conceptually (albeit
only partially) alike.' If mathematics can stand in for rationalism, then
it is worth noting that the most famous bit of algebra in American law-
a rule expressed in terms of three arithmetic variables-comes from the
law of negligence.2 4
219. I have chosen the phrase "accident law" even though most writings about the problem of
pure economic loss favor "tort law" or "negligence." "Tort law" includes intentional harm, whereas
I wish to focus on unintended consequences. "Negligence" is underinclusive, giving short shrift to
strict liability and the contracts theme present in many economic loss and products liability cases. See
generally Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash
of Tort and Contract Theory, 49 U. Cm. L REv. 61, 128 (1982) (describing the boundary between tort
and contract).
220. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
221. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 47 ("most tort claims are for negligence"); JOSEPH W.
GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (1995) ("Surely the most common basis for tort liability is
negligent conduct.").
222. See supra note 19 (contrasting "the law of the horse" with doctrinal concepts such as
contract and privacy).
223. Contrast the other two types of "tortious conduct," intentional torts and strict liability, which
pay specific doctrinal attention to discrete categories of activity and injury. See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, DiVISION ONE (1965) (enumerating "interests" protected by the law of intentional torts, such
as the interest in freedom from harmful bodily contact and the interest in freedom from confinement);
id. chs. 20 & 21 (1977) (outlining strict liability for certain acts of animals and for abnormally
dangerous activities). By contrast Chapter 12, the negligence chapter, and Chapter 16, addressing
causation as part of negligence, speak generally about concepts such as risk and foreseeability.
224. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)
(declaring that "if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends on
whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B < PL"). Some years before the Carroll Towing
decision Hand had expressed a doubt about the Hand formula, worrying-as would a person given to
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Rationalists, as we have seen, believe that legal remedies for wrongs
ought to withstand an inquiry about their purpose.2' The rationalist ver-
nacular relating to objectives and commitments in tort law-
"compensation," "deterrence," "corrective justice," "public policy,"
and the like-will not permit liability to turn only on the fortuity of
which entities injure or suffer injury. Nevertheless, accident law em-
braces exactly that fortuity.
Accident law is replete with depictionalist interest in physical im-
ages. For instance, invasions of land are covered by "trespass" when
the invading entities, or the things damaged, are big and tangible, but by
the less-favorable-to-plaintiffs law of "nuisance" when the invaders
amount to small, intangible "particulate matter" that does not create
tangible damage. 6 The "impact" and "physical manifestation" rules
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, still followed, bar plaintiffs
whose emotional distress was not accompanied by contemporaneous
physical contact or manifested in physical effects.227 Pure economic loss
and products liability warrant particular attention, however, because of
their relative importance within the law of torts.
1. Pure Economic Loss.
Courts compensate plaintiffs generously for accidental harm to
their persons or their tangible property: the cymbal-like crash against a
thing can herald the beginning of liability.s Economic loss caused by
wrongful conduct that is unaccompanied by damage to persons or
property, however, generally lies uncompensated where it falls. -9 The
depictionalism-whether it forced a choice between "incommensurables." Conway v. O'Brien, 111
F.2d 611,612 (2d Cir. 1940).
225. See supra notes 134-137, 155-161 and accompanying text, and infra notes 236-257 and
accompanying text.
226. See Mock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (D. Idaho 1992); Maddy v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1539-40 (D. Kan. 1990). One court has commented on the bad
science underlying this distinction. See Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 788-
89 (Wash. 1985) (reminding readers that e--me2 ).
227. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 512 U.S. 532, 547 n.5 (1994) (noting that "impact
rule" persists in at least five states); id. at 549 n.ll (noting prevalence of "physical manifestation"
rule).
228. Apparently, I am not alone in my taste for over-the-top metaphors about the economic loss
anomaly. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985)
(asserting that economic loss rule "capriciously showers compensation along the path of physical
destruction").
229. Like many tort rules hostile to plaintiffs, this tradition gained acceptance with the help of
Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927)
(declining to award damages in tort because plaintiff suffered no damage to his personal property).
The first case to state the rule of no liability for economic injury unaccompanied by physical damage
was decided in Britain. See Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 L.R.-Q.B. 453, 457 (1875). A
Connecticut case had reached a similar result in 1856. See Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New
York & New Haven R.R. Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856) (holding that a railroad, which had negligently
caused the death of an insured person, had no duty to avoid financial loss to an insurance company).
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tangibility of a harmed interest-not the nature of a defendant's con-
duct or any other criterion associated with rationalist policy-
determines whether a plaintiff can receive compensation for wrongfully
inflicted harm." Richard Epstein notes the anomaly:
The defendant is by hypothesis negligent; the plaintiff's harm is
typically foreseeable, even if the precise identity of the plaintiff
is not; there are rarely any intervening acts or events sufficient to
sever the causal connection; and typically there are no affirma-
tive defenses based on the plaintiff's misconduct. Why then the
denial?"'
Well, to start, there are always our friends the floodgates. 32 Merito-
rious theory, one might say, but too many potential claims. 33 This re-
sponse is flimsy. Litigants can abuse or overuse any legal category, yet
tort law retains categorization. Established tort categories such as prod-
ucts liability and negligent infliction of emotional distress once pro-
voked courts and commentators to raise a false alarm about
floodgates.' But the dockets have proved moderate.25
The rule limiting recovery for economic loss in tort prevails today in the United States, although this
ascendancy has been shaken. See Joseph W. Little, Erosion of No-Duty Negligence Rules in England,
The United States, and Common Lav Commonwealth Nations, 20 Hous. L REv. 959, 1007 (1983).
230. See Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 360 (Alaska 1987) (critiquing and
rejecting the traditional economic damage no duty rule). Compare Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v.
Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 1995) (permitting claim for damages ascribed to
property damage while rejecting claim ascribed to lost profits based on the inability to sell the
property) with Guido v. Hudson Transit Lines, 178 F.2d 740,742 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding that because
the plaintiff could recover for the destruction of his truck, he could also recover lost profits
attributable to that destruction). See also Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle, Inc. 69 F.3d 1432,
1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (classifying lost tuna catch as property damage); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1308 (Ill. App. 1980) (pointing out that harms caused by a faulty
herbicide have been classified judicially both as economic loss (no recovery) and by other courts as
property damage (compensable)).
231. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1354 (6th ed. 1995).
232. See David W. Robertson, Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic
Loss: Negligence Actions and the Tort of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, 46 LA.
L REv. 737, 749-50 (1986) (listing eight "floodgates factors" that make courts adverse to recovery
for economic loss).
233. See Ann O'Brien, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litigation for
Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 959, 966 (1989) (expressing worry
about "overloading the courts"); Kelly M. Hnatt, Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for
Recovery, 73 IowA L REv. 1181, 1182-83 (1988) (calling the rule "a convenient touchstone for
limiting recovery").
234. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (Abinger, C.B.) (predicting
"the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which [the author of the opinion could] see no
limit," if privity were abandoned); see also Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974)
(establishing high hurdle of causation for plaintiffs who allege negligent infliction of emotional
distress).
235. See Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARiz. L REv. 1247, 1253-59 (1995)
(discussing floodgates). See generally Bernstein, supra note 31, at 1543 (noting manageability of
these two causes of action).
THE REPRESENTATIONAL DIALECTIC
After pausing to comment briefly on the floodgates,"a Professor
Epstein goes on to consider two answers to his question from the law
and economics literature, 7 the source of many rationalist efforts to
deny the embarrassing presence of depictionalism in the law. The first
"answer" comes from the English scholar William Bishop, who claims
that rejecting economic loss claims is proper because in such cases there
are usually no net social costs, merely "transfers" from one set of firms
to another."5 Economist Mario Rizzo has refuted this argument, 2 9 and
in any event one does not need training in economics to spot the costs
of finding alternative sources to meet one's needs after a breach, as well
as the costs of precautions (in anticipation of an unremediable breach)
that potential plaintiffs must take.2'
The second law-and-economics "answer," almost equally uncon-
vincing, comes from an argument by Professor Rizzo that the rule of no
recovery is designed to encourage "channeling contracts.""24 Channel-
ing contracts are indemnity agreements between those who suffer physi-
cal impact and those who suffer only economic loss from that impact.242
According to Rizzo, courts want parties to enter into channeling con-
tracts presumably because these contracts reduce the costs of litigation
and therefore help to maximize wealth. The courts express this encour-
agement by siding with defendants where the plaintiff could have
"channeled" but did not, Rizzo contends, and siding with plaintiffs
when channeling would have been impossible.243
A couple of basic flaws mar this argument. First, neither tort nor
contract law shares such heavyhanded enthusiasm for efficiency in gen-
eral or indemnification and other "channeling" in particular; the
common law frequently indulges in wasteful and expensive proce-
dures.2' Courts have not cooperated reliably in the enforcement of even
236. See EPSTEIN, supra note 231, at 1330.
237. See id. at 1354-55.
238. See W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1982).
239. See Mario J. Rizzo, The Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop, 2 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 197, 201-04 (1982).
240. See EPSTEIN, supra note 231, at 1355.
241. Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Lmv of Torts, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 281, 282
(1982).
242. See id. at 291.
243. See id. at 292-99, 304-07.
244. See Richard A. Epstein, Lmv and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U.
CH. L REv. 1167, 1170 (1997) (noting that "efficient common law" hypothesis has not explained
why judicial regulation has increased while transaction costs have declined, nor why statutes and the
common law move in the same direction); Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L. 862, 869-
73 (1983) (giving examples of inefficient rules, including some strict liability and "stop look and
listen" rules for railroad crossings). These illustrations contradict some law and economics
scholarship of the last twenty years, which has contended that common lav development follows the
prescriptions of efficiency analysis. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Lawv Efficient?, 6 1.
LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (stating the efficiency thesis); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
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simple indemnity contracts."5 Second, as Robert Rabin has pointed out,
case law does not comport with the Rizzo "channeling" theory: courts
have denied recovery to plaintiffs even where channeling would have
been impossible.246
Yet this defense of a no-recovery rule has value, even though I
would contend that Rizzo has exaggerated the strength of his argument.
No empirical evidence supports Rizzo's claim that encouraging chan-
neling is an efficient legal rule, nor that channeling is desirable for any
other reason. Courts, accordingly, have no reason to endorse the Rizzo
analysis when they decide pure economic loss cases. Despite this nor-
mative vacuum, however, and despite Professor Rabin's point about de-
scriptive inaccuracy with respect to case law,247 the channeling theory
does contribute to a richer description of the economic loss problem.
The Rizzo metaphor evokes physical convergence, a flowing-together of
disparate materials. The ephemera of pure economic loss can, through
"channeling," merge into the solid thud of physical impact. Impact,
being the weightier of the two, dominates and consumes pure economic
loss.248
Some writers have stated this point in normative terms, arguing that
this physical wallop should matter. One commentator contends that even
though economic loss claims can resemble harms to persons or prop-
erty, "laws of physics" support the current rule. In this view, an impact
against person or property serves as a blunt instrument to keep down the
number of plaintiffs who could otherwise, given the complexity of fi-
nancial interrelation, bring an infinite number of tort claims.249 Also
borrowing physics jargon, Fleming James contends that financial loss is
part of a "chain reaction" best addressed by business planning and in-
surance
°50
Economic loss, in both reported decisions and scholarship, thus
wafts away from the tangibility of accident law25' With the coolness that
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L REv. 1697, 1703-05 (1996) (presenting variations on this thesis); J.B.
Ruh], The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and
Its Practical Meaningfor Democracy, 49 VAND. L REv. 1407, 1433-34 (1996) (detailing view that
the common law evolves, in quasi-biological fashion, toward efficiency).
245. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 341 n.5 (5th
ed. 1984).
246. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513, 1536 (1985).
247. See id.
248. Nowhere does Rizzo imagine a reverse phenomenon, whereby physical injuries channel
themselves into economic loss claims.
249. See Perlman, supra note 219, at 71-72.
250. See Fleming James Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REv. 43, 45 (1972).
251. See Hartwin Bungert, Compensating Harm to the Defective Product Itself-A Comparative
Analysis of American and German Products Liability Law, 66 TUL. L Rev. 1179, 1261 (1992) ("other
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characterizes rationalism, a person may anticipate losing her money.
Breached contracts, financial reversals, erratic supplies, and lapses of
professional judgment in business plans fit calmly into the design of
one's life. But a physical blow, even if "foreseeable," lands with im-
pact. Its force is unexpected. A thing-the body or tangible property-
gets hit. Following this predilection, courts not only favor personal and
property injury claims at the expense of economic loss (where the
plaintiff "could have known better"),"2 but also frown on contractual
disclaimers of personal injury liability. 3
By way of summary: Were accident law rationalist rather than
depictionalist, it would choose one of two alternatives to the current
rules that honor personal and property interests and disfavor "pure
economic" interests. A rationalist accident law could accept the implicit
Epstein invitation and merge personal, property, and economic interests
into the same rule, looking in all cases for rationalist landmarks such as
breach of duty, proximate cause, and plaintiff's-conduct defenses.'
Alternatively, a rationalist could distinguish, as Richard Abel does, be-
tween injury to the human body and injury to "property. ''""s Under this
approach, accidentally hurting someone's finances would be treated the
same as accidentally hurting her airplane or warehouse: no recovery for
either injury.56 In other words, one could choose either to expand or
constrict liability for economic loss while remaining within the confines
of rationalism. Current doctrine, classifying interests based on their tan-
gibility, has'rejected both of these rationalist courses.57
compensable harm is the floating element that carries harm to the product itself into the scope of
recovery").
252. See Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 739-40 (1lth Cir.
1995) (maintaining that plaintiffs can protect themselves in contract negotiation); Bocre Leasing
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1995) (asserting that the plaintiff should
lose because during the negotiations over its contract with the defendant, it had "eschewed the very
protections" it wanted later, in hindsight).
253. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 89-95 (N.J. 1960) (striking down
disclaimer); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFOIRM COMMERCIAL CODE 485 (1980) (["W]henever a consumer's blood is spilled, even wild
horses could not stop a sympathetic court from plowing through the most artfully drafted and
conspicuously printed disclaimer in order to grant relief.").
254. See infra note 257 (describing one judge's effort in that direction); Mattingly v. Sheldon
Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 360-61 (Alaska 1987); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 110-114 (N.J. 1985); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979). See
also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICN. L Rnv. 1, 15 (1953) ("'When we find a duty,
breach and damage, everything has been said.").
255. See Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Laiv Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN
DiEGo L. REv. 79, 101-06 (1986).
256. See id. at 101.
257. A recent case may be a straw in the wind of future change. After a lengthy exegesis on the
economic loss rule, one district court opinion proposed to replace depictionalism with
rationalism: "[A]pplication of the economic loss doctrine should not pivot on the type of damage
suffered by the plaintiff (e.g. personal injury v. property damage), but rather should turn on
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2. Products Liability.
Unless objects matter qua things, it is hard to explain the emer-
gence and persistence of products liability as a separate legal category
with unique rules." Nor can one understand why the doctrinal label is
not "producer's liability" or "seller's liability," given that the defin-
ing trait of a products liability case is a defendant who regularly sells the
type of thing in question. 9 Rationalist rules from torts and contracts
could have handled things-related injury without building a separate
doctrine relating to injurious products. Yet depictionalism in this area
has to date withstood rationalist incursions.
By now some recurring elements of the representational dialectic
will look familiar to readers. From rationalist scholars we hear the cries
about perversity and senselessness. They argue that products liability
ought to be abolished because it adds nothing to negligence law, while
adding plenty to confusion and error.2" Why, then, did the concept
evolve? Politics, say some rationalists; "products liability" made a con-
venient banner first for social engineers like Judge Roger Traynor of
the California Supreme Court,261 and later for tort reformers who needed
a handy scapegoat for the benefit of their liability-dodging corporate
sponsors. 2 Reminiscent of the forfeiture rationales,263 this realpolitik
answer cannot explain the appeal of "products liability," especially its
resonance among constituencies with no agenda to advance. The dialec-
tic goes on. Rationalists argue. Depictionalism survives.
Unlike obscenity, forfeiture, and pure economic loss, however,
products liability has been a locus of well-coordinated, intellectually
serious reform efforts that seek to replace depictionalism with rational-
ism. Many products liability reform measures emphasize rationalist
goals like consistency and predictability,264 and despite the claims of
considerations such as the use of the product (e.g. commercial v. residential), characteristics of
plaintiff (e.g. manufacturer v. private consumer) and policies implicated in the case (e.g. contract
law v. tort law)." Republic Ins. Co. v. Broan Mfg. Co., 960 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
258. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 1-3.
259. See id. A similar question was first posed by the British comparativist J.A. Jolowicz. See
J.A. Jolowicz, Product Liability in the EEC, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 369, 370-76
(David S. Clark ed., 1990) (querying whether products liability amounts to liability for "producing" or
"selling").
260. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 3-6 (citing sources).
261. The Traynor landmarks are Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
262. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 4-6.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 196-209.
264. See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform in
1997. History and Public Policy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L REV. 595, 603 (1997)
(stressing themes of consistency and predictability); Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed.
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some critics that proponents seek crudely to shift distributions of wealth
in favor of manufacturers or insurers,26 this rationalist rhetoric should
not be dismissed out of hand.2" Two prominent endeavors in products
liability reform, the Restatement (Third) of Torts267 and a bill that passed
both houses of Congress in 1996,268 illustrate the relation between a
depictionalist legal category and rationalist inroads.
The products liability Restatement, which American Law Institute
director Geoffrey Hazard has described as standing stalwart against
"tendentious but unreasoned argumentation, 269 maintains a commit-
ment to rationalism. Its boldest stance-a requirement that a plaintiff in
design defect cases prove that "a reasonable alternative design" could
have reduced or avoided foreseeable risks of harm 7T-emphasizes
rationalist themes of negligence and risk-utility balancing.27' The rea-
sonable alternative design rule stands in opposition to its depictionalist
counterpart, a "consumer expectations test" that finds an essence within
every product, independent of alternatives, tradeoffs, or other expres-
sions of ratiocination.272
Continuing down the rationalist path, the Restatement conceives of
three types of "product defect" -manufacturing defect, design defect,
and defect based on inadequate instructions or warnings-of which all
but one, manufacturing defect, can be expressed in terms of negligence,
a rationalist tenet.7" In a comment, the Reporters of the Restatement de-
fend the anomalous treatment of manufacturing flaws by explaining
that liability without fault for manufacturing defects will "foster several
Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979) (asserting that unpredictability stemming from inconsistencies among
states in products liability law harms the availability of insurance).
265. See Ralph Nader, Lawyers and Law Students as Tools of Democracy, 17 WHITTIER L REV.
3, 5 (1995) (referring to the influence of the "tortfeasors lobby"); Remarks of Prof. Larry Garvin,
Transcript of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium: Fact, Laiv, Policy, and Significance, 25
FLA. ST. U. L REV. 737, 810-11 (1998) (calling tort and products liability reform "retrograde" and
the product of "fierce advocacy").
266. I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, A Model of Products Liability Reform, 27 VAL. U. L REV.
637, 645-47 (1993).
267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY (1997) [hereinafter PRODUTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT].
268. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
481 (1996); see also Jerry J. Phillips et al., Foreword, 64 TENN. L. REV. 557, 557 n.1 (1997).
269. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to PRODUcTs LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 267,
at xvi.
270. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 267, § 2, at 12.
271. See Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.
L REFORt 197, 204 (1997).
272. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L REV. 631 (1995) (describing the Restatement's choice of risk-utility over
consumer expectations). See generally Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 386-88 (1988) (detailing theoretical complexities of
economic analysis in risk-utility balancing).
273. See PRODucTs LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 267, § 2, at 12.
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objectives," and in this way insist that even the most depictionalist ele-
ment of their three-part division comports with rationalism. 74
Attempting to take products liability law from depictionalism into
rationalism, the Restatement attempts a transformation comparable to
the famous Fall of the Citadel.275 That great fall traditionally is seen as a
rationalist triumph276-Cardozo's logic overcoming an archaic privity
rule and its "vague and imperfectly defined" exceptions277-but as
usual depictionalism had a later, if not the last, laugh: "products liabil-
ity" is arguably more depictionalist than "privity of contract.""27 So
too does the Restatement espouse rationalism while ultimately affirming
the separate nature of product-caused injury and, thus, the unique na-
ture of tangible entities.
The second endeavor in reform, the effort to enact national prod-
ucts liability reform, has hewed more closely to a rationalist line. In its
iteration as the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of
1996, which Congress passed in March 1996 and President Clinton ve-
toed the following May,279 federal products liability reform proclaimed
various "findings" about the current liability regime. These findings
included arbitrariness, inconsistency, adverse effects on consumers,
harms to international competitiveness, and burdens on interstate com-
merce.8" By refusing to isolate "products liability" as a bounded cate-
gory,28' and insisting that the United States needs a products liability law
tailored to address the legal and economic policies of the nation, this
reform act continued rationalist incursions into a depictionalist law that
had been underway for two decades. 2
274. Id. at 13.
275. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791 (1966) (using a metaphor of collapse to describe the abolition of the privity rule for
product-caused injury); see also PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 267, at xxxi-xxxii;
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L REv. 1512 (1992) (describing the Restatement
agenda). The Restatement, and restatements in general, are ambitious works, attempting what is
almost impossible to achieve. See Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1688-
94 (1995); see also Shapo, supra note 272 (warning about dangers of restating).
276. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 20-25 (1949).
277. KEETON ET AL., supra note 245, at 682.
278. See id. at 681-82 (reciting rationalist defenses of the privity rule, now discredited, based on
foreseeability, contractual freedom, and economic policy); see also Groppel Co. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 56 (Mo. App. 1981) (noting that privity rule helps to define duty). Cf
Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1982) (defending privity rule for attorney malpractice
claims).
279. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 267.
280. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
481 (1996).
281. See id. (mingling non-products related reforms, such as incentives to alternative dispute
resolution, into the legislation).
282. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 264, at 598-601 (describing history of failed efforts at
federalizing products liability law).
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If the congressional-reform contingent is right, the interesting
question is why products liability remains arbitrary, inconsistent, bad for
competitiveness, worse for consumers, and everything else that tort re-
formers charge, despite well-funded efforts at change.Y We have al-
ready heard a few rationales.' Similar rationalist explanations have
continued during the debate over federal reform. Tort reformers Victor
Schwartz and Mark Behrens identify the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America and "its allied professional consumer groups" as the cul-
prits.s Jerry Phillips suggests that federal products liability reform may
be unconstitutional as of 1995.6 In his 1996 veto message, President
Clinton averted to the argument that some reform provisions, particu-
larly a cap on pain and suffering damages, unfairly burden female
plaintiffs.' These statements indicate that defenders of the unreformed
status quo, as well as critics, find products liability law intelligible
through rationalism.
Contrary to both rationalist attack and rationalist explanations of
the status quo, however, products liability remains at its heart still unre-
formed and depictionalist, writing separate rules for detriment caused by
tangible physical entities. As commentators have detailed, courts take
pains to distinguish products from conduct,s sales from services, 9
"foreign" contaminants in food from "natural" ones,2' and workplace
products liability from workers' compensation.29' The fortuity of a
physical object in a case can divert punitive damages to a state
283. For a summary of complaints presented by tort reformers, see JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. &
AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 707-14 (3d ed. 1997).
284. See supra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
285. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 264, at 597.
286. See Jerry J. Phillips, Hoist by One's Own Petard: When a Conservative Commerce Clause
Interpretation Meets Conservative Tort Reform, 64 TENN. L REv. 647, 654-56 (1997) (citing United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
287. Clinton contended that the statute "unfairly discriminates against the most vulnerable
members of our society-the elderly, the poor, children, and nonworking women" because of its
devaluation of noneconomic injury. See William J. Clinton, Why Clinton Vetoed Product Liability
Reform, IND. LAW., May 29-June 11, 1996, at 21 (printing veto message in full); see also Thomas
Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 1 (1995) (arguing that women bear the brunt of much tort reform); Lisa M. Ruda, Note, Caps on
Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff. Heeding the Warning Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
RV. 197, 197-202 (1993) (describing effects on women plaintiffs from reform measures at the state
level).
288. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 65-68.
289. See Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theories to Service Transactions,
47 S.C. L. Rav. 231, 245-47 (1996).
290. See HENDERSON & TwERslu, supra note 283, at 96-97.
291. See Thomas A. Eaton, Revisiting the Intersection of Workers' Compensation and Product
Liability: An Assessment of a Proposed Federal Solution to an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L REv. 881,
883-97 (1997).
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treasury,2" determine which statute of limitation will control,293 and,
when the object consists of a small noncommercial airplane, invoke the
only federal time limit on litigation about a defective product.294 As the
dialectic between depictionalism and rationalism proceeds, products li-
ability warrants attention as a possible site of significant rationalist
change. Despite its many successes in the states and near-successes at the
federal level, however, products liability reform has not abandoned the
depictionalism on which it rests.
1I
THE BASES OF DEPICTIONALISM
The previous two Parts of this Article showed the triumphs-or at
least the stamina-of depictionalism within the representational dialec-
tic. We may now consider the sources of this strength. Depictionalism
endures in legal doctrine because it corresponds to the way human be-
ings think, learn, and coexist. These cognitive and political implications
not only illuminate the successes of depictionalism, but also point up
some of its worrisome characteristics, a point to be explored in Part IV.
A. Philosophy and Politics
Distinguishing between phenomena and noumena, Kant noted the
limits of abstraction and the great power of images: "[W]e cannot
cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we commence with concep-
tions alone."'295 This assertion from Critique of Pure Reason suggests
that the dialectic between depictionalism and rationalism in American
law follows a more fundamental division in philosophy. Knowledge, as
philosophers put the point, arises from both direct observation of phe-
nomena and the application of intellect to that experience. While the
phrases vary-Locke contrasted "sensation" with "the operation of
our minds;"296 Kant paired "phenomena" with "noumena" and mun-
dus sensibilis with mundus intelligibilis9'-the dichotomy endures. Even
292. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993) (upholding statute against
constitutional challenge).
293. See Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 798 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Catherine Colyer,
Wrongful Infection With the HIV Virus: When Should the Clock Start Ticking on the Statute of
Limitations?, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 235, 256-59 (1996) (discussing the statute of limitations issue
in products liability cases).
294. See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40120 (1996)). See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, The Road to Federal Product Liability Reform, 55 MD. L REv. 1363, 1374 (1996)
(discussing unique nature of this law).
295. KANT, supra note 7, at 106.
296. See LocKE, supra note 4.
297. See KANT, supra note 7, at 93-97 (identifying phenomena as "empirical objects" and
noumena as "the conception of such objects").
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philosophical traditions that assert the unity between things and abstrac-
tions, such as Idealism and branches of Eastern philosophy, depend on
contrasts between depictionalist and rationalist ways of knowing.298
From these wide-ranging philosophical sources, a law reformer
may infer that depictionalism as a source of knowledge will not readily
go away. Human cognition depends on knowledge by acquaintance.
Sometimes misinforming and sometimes catalysts of insights, images of
objects are necessary constituents of understanding. A person may build
on knowledge by acquaintance to achieve a more complex knowledge
by description of a related phenomenon; but as a method, knowledge
by acquaintance is fundamental, and cannot be superseded by abstrac-
tion. Three lessons follow.
First, devotees of positivist versions of law and economics that pur-
sue efficiency, 9 framers of restatements and comprehensive codes who
attempt to clean up disarray,3" partisans of free expression who want to
limit censorship," 1 and their colleagues in other areas of rationalist law
reform must recognize that they cannot overcome a depictionalist legal
rule simply by asserting-or even proving-its lack of rationality. As we
have seen, the experiences of law reform pertaining to obscenity, for-
feiture, and accidents bear out what philosophers might have predicted.
Depictionalism sticks because it resonates with human understanding,
even after rationalists demonstrate its pernicious effects in a particular
legal context.
A second warning from philosophy reminds reformers that the de-
sire to supersede depictionalism with rationalism can lead to error, in a
philosophical sense. Philosophers generally accept the dichotomy in
perception described above, between knowledge by acquaintance and
knowledge by description. More contested, but also widely held, is the
philosophical outlook called "naturalism," which demands fidelity to
empirical, observed reality rather than to a prior "first philosophy." ' 2
Describing naturalist philosophy, Ernest Nagel explains that "the mani-
fest plurality and variety of things, of their qualities and their functions,
are an irreducible feature of the cosmos, not a deceptive appearance
298. See id. (maintaining that "real things" may not exist outside the world); Mark Siderits,
Buddhist Reductionism, 47 PHIL. EAST & WEsT 455, 457 (1997) (distinguishing "reductionism,"
characteristic of Buddhism, with "eliminativism," a stance contrary to Buddhism that disparages even
the conventional utility of recognizing entities as real). See generally NINIAN SmART, DImENSIONS
OF THE SACRED passim (1996) (linking theological and philosophical belief systems to find common
themes of depictionalism and rationalism).
299. See supra notes 210-215, 238-244 and accompanying text.
300. See Bernstein, supra note 275 (questioning prospect of restatements).
301. See supra notes 129-143 and accompanying text.
302. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEx.
L REv. 267, 285-93 (1997) (describing current ascendant status of naturalist philosophy and outlining
its variants).
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cloaking some more homogeneous 'ultimate reality' or transempirical
substance."3"3 Like Kant, Nagel does not intend to disparage all of ab-
straction-he takes a moment to note the value of Newtonian mechanics,
for instance 34-but instead questions the philosophical search for all-
encompassing universality.
Naturalism has its critics, and their rejection of this philosophical
outlook-some of which has been aired in the law reviews 3 5-will not
be adjudged in this Article. I want to say only that naturalist philosophy,
despite once having been labeled "a species of philosophical mo-
nism,"3"6 lends support, perhaps in a normative as well as a descriptive
sense, to depictionalism in the law. If reality is indeed varied, eclectic,
and empirically derived, rather than an unchanging absolute truth, then
"senseless" depictionalist legal rules necessarily might make sense.
This reference to the dichotomy between pluralism and monism"0 7
brings us to a third philosophical basis-pluralism-for the depiction-
alist status quo in American law. In its rejection of the unification that
rationalism delivers within law reform, depictionalist doctrine takes a
stand in favor of pluralistic philosophy. This tradition has enjoyed a
strong philosophical pedigree for a century.
Whereas monism insists on unity, wrote William James in 1909, plu-
ralism allows things to exist "in a distributive form of reality, the each-
form.""3 ' Like depictionalism, James's pluralism denied the existence of
finality, absolute truths, and "single-word answers."3 9 Affirmations of
this philosophy of pluralism appear in literary works as well as philo-
sophical writings."
Of James's heirs in pluralist philosophy, Isaiah Berlin achieved
particular distinction. Berlin's famous revival of an aphorism by the
Greek poet Archillechus, "The fox knows many things, but the hedge-
hog knows one big thing," restates the dichotomy between pluralism
and monism. One might say that depictionalism knows many things and
303. Ernest Nagel, Naturalism Reconsidered, in ENCOUNTER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHILOSOPHY 101, 104 (Ramona Cormier et al. eds., 1970).
304. See id. at 103; see also id. at 104 (noting well-supported conclusions from physical
cosmology about the evolutionary development of stars and galactic systems).
305. See Leiter, supra note 302, at 286 (naming Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and John
McDowell as prominent critics); Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 153,
160 (1996) (equating "naturalism" with "materialism").
306. See Arthur C. Danto, Naturalism, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 448 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1972).
307. See WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE (1909).
308. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
309. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Thirteen Books You Must Read to Understand
America: Schlesinger's Syllabus, 49 AM. HERITAGE 30, 34 (1998).
310. See Stanley Wertheim, The Pluralistic Philosophy of Stephen Crane, 7 ANQ: A Q. J. oF
SHORT ARTICLES, NOTES, & REVIEWS 173, 174 (1994) (reviewing PATRICK K. DOOLEY, THE
PLURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF STEPHEN CRANE).
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rationalism knows one big thing. Berlin favored the fox, associating the
hedgehog with totalitarianism. " ' Berlin's dichotomy helps to extract a
normative aspect of depictionalism. When Berlin emphasized the rela-
tion between pluralist philosophy and pluralist politics-if the universe
is multiple and unfinished, then society must be multiple too91-he
showed that links therefore exist between (pluralist) depictionalism and
a variety of social and political developments of the late-twentieth-
century United States. As Leon Wieseltier argues, this eclecticism and
rejection of totality can support a renascent liberalism.313
A similar link connects pluralism and libertarianism."4 Libertarian
political theory depends on the premise, which its patriarch Friedrich
von Hayek rightly called "non-rational," that the chaos resulting from
individual freedom is better than centralized order. The eclectic players
of depictionalism can scatter power among many, while rationalism
centralizes.1 5 In preferring "democratization" to "democracy" as a
nominal form, one political theorist argues that the task of democratic
societies is to grow more inclusive, recognizing ever more groups, cate-
gories, and individuals.3 6 These participants, varied and eclectic (like
images, in this respect), are the constituents of liberal democracy. 7
Complementing this endorsement of liberalism, some critics of lib-
eralism make a similar point about power-scattering. Ethicists Willard
Gaylin and Bruce Jennings attack the monolithic use of rationalism as a
311. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox 1 (1953); see also Louis Menand, The
Return of Pragmatism, 48 AM. HERITAGE 48, 51 (1997).
312. See Menand, supra note 311.
313. See Leon Wieseltier, When a Sage Dies, All Are His Kin, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 1997, at
27 (eulogizing Isaiah Berlin); see also MACEDO, supra note 39, at 237-38 (noting importance of
"social pluralism" within liberal regimes); Hedy Nai-Lin Chang, Democracy, Diversity, and Social
Capital, 86 NAT'L CIvic REv. 141, 144 (1997) (discussing the relation between diversity and the
philosophy of pluralism).
314. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 30 (1960). Evoking the dialectic, Hayek
proposed a dichotomy between French "rationalism" and British "empiricism," expressing a strong
preference for the latter. See id. at 56-58. He went so far as to enlist Adam Smith in his cause, with
the argument that the invisible hand depends on plural sources. See id. Reason, Hayek continued, is
"man's most precious possession," but by no means the sole answer to questions of state policy. Id. at
69.
315. An analogy appears in the law of charities. Commenting on the American decision to
subsidize charities indirectly (through favorable tax treatment) rather than directly (through transfer
payments), economist Estelle James mentioned pluralism as part of the reason for the choice: "I think
one of the reasons why we use the indirect tax subsidy approach is that we are a very heterogeneous
society. As such, we find it difficult to agree on which functions to subsidize .... We avoid making
these choices explicitly by decentralizing our decision-making." Comment of Estelle James in
Discussant Remarks and Audience Questions, 39 CASE W. Ras. L REv. 829, 831 (1989).
316. See John S. Dryzek, Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization, 90 AM. POL.
ScI. REv. 475,476 (1996).
317. See generally Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 73-74 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (referring to an "interlocking net
of... multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations").
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means of setting social policy.318 Rationalism alone, Gaylin and Jennings
argue, cannot yield the best policy prescription-especially if it clings to
the precept that coercion is presumptively wrong.3"9 Though inclined
personally to fear coercion more and autonomy less, I find in the
Gaylin and Jennings thesis a pertinent distinction between "political
liberalism" and "social liberalism."3" Political liberalism fears the tyr-
anny and physical force of the state. Social liberalism twists this fear
into a vague, generalized distrust "of all forms of social or interpersonal
control."32' Applauding the former and condemning the latter, Gaylin
and Jennings make a point that is relevant to the representational dialec-
tic. Images-like the forms of social and interpersonal control that in-
terest Gaylin and Jennings-evoke emotion, link up cognitively with
other images and ideas, and imply controls on behavior of a more plural
origin than mere state fiat. Although depictionalism is closely bound up
with legal control,3" it cannot be reduced simply to authoritarianism.
Sociological perspectives on the control of citizens' behavior under-
score a similar variety of controls, which correspond to the eclectic in-
puts of depictionalism 3
Writers and activists who prefer to focus on government find plu-
ralism integral to their law reform endeavors. All decisions to make a
change, including those to change legal doctrine, carry with them some
peril. A pluralist ideology defends this risk with its premise that legal
change usually occurs at different stages in different environments, so
that its effects can be observed, and often remedied, before all of the
relevant population suffers.324 Louis Brandeis invoked this strategy when
he described the states as laboratories in the federal system.3" In
318. See WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY 174-76
(1996).
319. See id. at 179-82.
320. Id. at 229.
321. Id.
322. See supra Part II.
323. The vast "norms" literature that followed ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW
(1991), describes eclectic sources of constraint and coercion that are at least partially independent of
the state. For a short review of this literature, see Posner, supra note 244, at 1697-98. One noted
constraint is shame: in some societies, shame functions effectively as a diversified, extralegal source
of order. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L REV. 1880
(1991).
324. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country"); see also Jim Davis H, Note, BMW v.
Gore: Why the States (Not the U.S. Supreme Court) Should Review Substantive Due Process
Challenges to Large Punitive Damage Awards, 46 KAN. L REV. 395, 404-05 (1998) (commending
"laboratories").
325. See supra note 324; see also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing successful innovations created in the federalist
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scholarly journals, writers sometimes describe their more fanciful law-
reform ideas as "thought experiments." '326 Judges and activists speak of
"test cases."
327
These metaphors borrowed from the natural sciences 328 indicate
tensions within reform struggles. Law reform must be pluralist, but ra-
tionalist reforms are monist. Experiment and observation occur in the
absence of certainty,329 whereas rationalist crusaders express their confi-
dence that a legal tradition is senseless and that anti-depictionalist re-
form can defeat that which is irrational and perverse.3 ° The experience
of successful law reform shows the tenacity of depictionalism. The life
of law reform, to recall Holmes, has not been logic but rather experi-
ence.331 One reason that depictionalism in obscenity, forfeiture, and ac-
cident law withstands assaults may relate to an inherent requirement that
law reform be pluralist rather than monist.
In sum, philosophical writings help to explain the perseverance of
depictionalism in at least three ways. First, they establish the primacy of
"laboratories"); DAVID L SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 87-88 (1995) (concluding that although the record
is mixed, state governments do innovate).
326. See Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J.
1283, 1283 (1984); Louis Kaplow, On the Divergence Between "Ideal" and Conventional Income-
Tax Treatment of Human Capital, 86 Am. ECON. REv. 347,349 (1996).
327. See Barrera v. Gober, 122 F.3d 1030, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Plager, J., concurring); In re
American Honda Motor Co., Dealer Relations Litigation, 979 F. Supp. 365, 368 (D. Md. 1997)
(proposing "test case" method of adjudicating the lawsuit, with limited jury trial and a series of
rounds). See generally William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among
Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J 1623, 1667-68 (1997)
(describing dynamics of test cases in civil rights movement).
328. For an early invocation of the metaphor, see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
226 (1821) ("the science of government... is the science of experiment"). We need not belabor the
analogy. See generally James A. Gardner, The "States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State
Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L REv. 475, 480-85 (1996) (critiquing the metaphor); Edward L.
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L REv. 903,
926 (1994) (noting that government action has little in common with the practices of experimental
science). My point is only that in the United States various governments work with different statutes,
constitutions, and precedents to create differing results within a federal whole; this eclecticism
comports with the variety that is inherent in depictionalism.
329. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Descartes, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 344, 353
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (faulting Descartes for favoring deduction over "experiment and
observation" in physical science). As some philosophers like to point out, Descartes purported to
"deduce" a theory of blood circulation and was wrong, whereas William Harvey dissected cadavers
and was right. See Geoffrey Gorham, Mind-Body Dualism and the Harvey-Descartes Controversy,
55 J. HIST. IDEAS 211 (1994).
330. See Coase, supra note 20, passim (contending nuisance law should put aside its aggressors
and victims in order to achieve allocative efficiency); text accompanying notes 162-165 (recounting
Justice Breyer's call for a rational forfeiture law), text accompanying notes 210-216 (summarizing
proposal to measure forfeiture by an "external cost index"), text accompanying note 231 (analyzing
pure commercial loss rule in rationalist terms), text accompanying notes 260-262 (noting rationalist
attacks on products liability doctrine).
331. See HOLMES, supra note 34, at 1 ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.").
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knowledge by acquaintance, suggesting that what rationalism tries to
obliterate is fundamental and essential, rather than primitive. Second, the
philosophical tradition labeled naturalism finds congenial the depiction-
alist insistence on particulars and empirics. Third, pluralism-a center-
piece of political philosophy linked closely to representative
government-illuminates the importance of depictionalism to law re-
form efforts, even though law reformers often like to identify with the
universalist abstractions associated with rationalism. Regardless of
whether the endurance of depictionalism is a good thing, then, lawmak-
ers and law reformers must take this continued existence into account.
B. Learning Theory
Psychologists identify numerous ways for human beings to acquire
information. They deem verbal means, which law tends to favor, to be
just one of several routes to cognition.332 Rationalist efforts at persuasion
depend on words, a flow of speech-and-writing varied by an occasional
foray into mathematics or symbolic notation.333 Depictionalism, by con-
trast, embraces the tangible, the visible, and the concrete nonverbal im-
age. Relatively indifferent to arguments, policies, incentives, causal
relationships, consistency with that-which-is-similar, and the presence of
commensurability that characterizes legal thinking, depictionalism
aligns itself with the eclecticism of learning theory.
Just as philosophers have maintained that knowledge by acquain-
tance precedes knowledge by description, developmental psychologists
have contended that the image is necessary to the commencement of
learning. The grandfather of developmental psychology, Jean Piaget,
argued that learning proceeds in sequence, with abstraction impossible
until the child masters the concrete.3 4 Psychologists following Piaget
built on this premise by recommending a pedagogy of "discovery," or
cognition through interaction with objects. 335 Feminist interpretations of
332. See generally JAMES J. THOMPSON, BEYOND WORDS passim (1973) (identifying time,
space, color, gestures, and touch as constituents of classroom learning); BERNICE Y.L. WONG, The
Relevance of Metacognition to Learning Disabilities, in LEARNING ABOUT LEARNING DISABILITIES
231, 234 (1991) (urging clinicians and learning-disabled persons to recognize the variety of cognitive
styles that can be manipulated to maximize comprehension).
333. See, e.g., Cema, supra note 210 (attempting to quantify the law of forfeiture). For a
facetious treatment of mathematics in law reviews, see 19 Authors, The Lav of Prime Numbers, 68
N.Y.U. L REv. 185 (1993). Compare JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS 47 (1992)
(lamenting effects of "esoteric" and "mathematical" legal scholarship) with Richard A. Posner, The
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L REv. 827, 835 (1988) (lamenting lack of training for
lawyers in formal logic).
334. See Jean Piaget, Piaget's Theory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 117-22 (Paul H.
Mussen ed., 1983); see also von Glasersfeld, supra note 4, at 373-74 (describing Piaget's concept of
"empirical abstraction").
335. See JEROME S. BRUNER, TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION 44-45 (1966) (describing
stages of learning from concrete to abstract); id. at 84 (advocating visual and spatial puzzles to
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Piaget stress the enduring value of concrete particulars.336 Piaget's de-
scription has thus metamorphosed into prescription: Because things
educate, they ought to be integrated into education. Advances in com-
puter technology have augmented these views.337
As with philosophy and political theory discussed above,38 learning
theory connects depictionalism to law. Trial lawyers cite learning theory
to praise demonstrative exhibits.339 In the law reviews, writers have bol-
stered the depictionalist cause by arguing that current pedagogical
practices in law schools neglect the power of visual imagery.' Some law
professors have castigated their colleagues by pointing out the disregard
of visual imagery in law teaching? I William Patton, a staunch exponent
expand learning); see also Anne Field, Parents Not Admitted Without Child Guardians, Bus. WEEK,
May 27, 1996, at 150 (noting rise of interactive children's museums).
336. Most famous among these efforts is the work of Carol Gilligan. Responding to Lawrence
Kohlberg, a follower of Piaget who had described a tendency of girls to remain stuck at pre-abstract
levels of cognition, Gilligan has argued that this commitment to the particular does not indicate a
failure to advance, but rather a different conception of moral reasoning. See Carol Gilligan, Moral
Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 19, 21-22 (Eva Feder Kittay
& Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
337. See SEYMOUR PAPERT, THE CHILDREN'S MACHINE: RETHINKING SCHOOL IN THE AGE
OF THE COMPUTER (1993) (claiming that computers can revolutionize childhood education: many
children, particularly girls, learn "kinesthetically" rather than "abstractly"); Seymour Papert,
Obsolete Skill Set: The 3Rs, WIRED, May-June 1993, at 50 (arguing that literacy in a visual age
encompasses more than reading-and-writing "letteracy"); Robert H. Thomas, "Hey, Did You Get My
E-Mail?" Reflections of a Retro-Grouch in the Computer Age of Legal Education, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC.
233, 241 (1994) (conceding that the electronic classroom benefits many types of learners, whereas its
nonelectronic predecessor benefits only aural learners).
338. See supra Section III.A.
339. See, e.g., Melvin M. Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.J.
284 (1950-51) (contending that demonstrative exhibits increase amount of awards to plaintiffs); R.
Dennis Donoghue, Demonstrative Exhibits: A Key to Effective Jury Presentations, 349 PLI/PAT.
LITIG. 369, 371 (1992) ("we are essentially visual learners"); see also Evelyn D. Kousoubris,
Computer Animation: Creativity in the Courtroom, 14 TamaP. ENVTL. L & TFCH. . 257, 272-73
(1995) (describing accounts from courtroom litigators, who identify jurors' overreliance on visual
images as the only real drawback of this technique).
340. See James Eagar, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in
Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REv. 389, 410-11 (1996-97) (arguing that legal pedagogy lags behind
other pedagogies in its use of visual materials); William M. Richman, Graphic Forms in Conflict of
Laivs, 27 U. TOL. L REv. 631, 631 (1996) (noting that conflicts, a "spatial" topic, is well suited to
visual presentation); Thomas, supra note 337, at 241.
341. See C. Garrison Lepow, Deconstructing Los Angeles or a Secret Fax from Magritte
Regarding Postliterate Legal Reasoning: A Critique of Legal Education, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69,
77 (1992) (commenting on the extraordinary impact of the Rodney King videotape, a visual work set
amidst uninspiring verbiage); William Wesley Patton, Opening Students' Eyes: Visual Learning
Theory in the Socratic Classroom, 15 LAw & PSYCH. REv. 1, 1-5 (1991) (noting deficiencies of
traditional pedagogy). But see Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law
Lawyer 48 AM. U.L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 1999) (questioning benefits of visual pedagogy,
specifically computer technology, in legal education).
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of the newer pedagogy, evokes a landmark of the representational dia-
lectic when he urges law teachers to create and use icons. 4 2
This reversal of iconoclasm that Professor Patton has envisioned-
whereby images would supersede words-casts doubt on the rationalist
conviction that depictionalism has a rendezvous with the dustbin of his-
tory. Interpretations of venerable teachings stress the value of the visual
and the concrete in cognition 43 at the same time that information tech-
nology-graphic, multimedia, interactive-moves society in a depic-
tionalist direction. But regardless of which side of the dialectic is
"winning, ' 4 learning theory has maintained continually that abstrac-
tion and argument cannot vanquish the other methods of understanding,
and they face an especially formidable competitor in the visual image.
C. Legitimation
As Bernard Hibbitts has noted, depictionalism is a source of legiti-
mation in a visually oriented society that likes to see its law at work."
Additional legitimation derives from the function of the image was a
brake on rapid legal change. The three areas of law used as illustrations
in this Article demonstrate some beneficial effects of this retardation. In
obscenity and accident law, this delaying function has proved advanta-
geous, and in forfeiture, delays have rendered benefits as well as detri-
ments to doctrine.
Once obscenity entered the realm of the First Amendment, for in-
stance, concepts such as "clear and present danger" could have opened
a wide avenue for rationalist reform?46 Constitutional obscenity law
might have developed differently if rationalism controlled: government
would have to show the harm of a work before suppressing it.47 Instead,
as we know, an "exclusion" approach stayed in place, whereby the clas-
sification of a particular thing as obscene determines its fate. Depiction-
alism has hampered freedom, then, if suppression is presumptively
contrary to freedom and if government does in fact take advantage of
its power to suppress, or if it chills expression merely by having such
power. Yet in practice this retardation of the freedom to consume puta-
tively obscene materials has respected liberal values, and coexisted with
342. See William Wesley Patton, An Opening Gambit in Teaching Juvenile Lmv: Creating Icons
of Normative Family Structures, 20 LAw & PSYCH. REv. 1 (1996).
343. See supra notes 334-336 (describing the teachings of Piaget and others).
344. See supra note 36.
345. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDozo L REV. 229, 244 (1994) (noting that
"visual legal metaphors have arguably helped make American law familiar and legitimate" because
they are situated in our "visually biased society").
346. See supra note 138-140 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
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considerable opportunity to read and consumeY Many thoughtful and
open-minded commentators would have struck the balance in favor of
more suppression than what our current depictionalist compromise has
achieved. 9 Depictionalism in obscenity doctrine has helped to achieve a
valuable degree of moderation within the law.5 0
Civil forfeiture law poses the toughest challenge for the
"retardation" argument; both anecdotes and reasoning support the
conclusion that current law clings to an unfortunate error.35' Yet even
this lamentable doctrine suggests that moving slowly in reform can offer
advantages. For instance, although innocent property owners have been
made to suffer by forfeiture, another class of victims-those from whom
criminals have stolen money or property-have received compensation
that would have otherwise been unavailable. 2 I do not mean to echo the
notorious argument, familiar from the law and economics literature on
predatory pricing and insider trading, that it is all right to let Peter steal
from Paul so long as overall social losses are zero or close to zero. 3
Victims of forfeiture have suffered unjustly, but not in vain: American
law underutilizes restitution, and forfeiture keeps restitution alive in both
348. The novelist John Updike wrote in 1986 to the chairman of the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography to defend the effects of these freedoms as they developed over the prior
twenty-five years:
I think that the relative sexual openness of recent times, including the public sale of
magazines and books which many consider reprehensible, has made my fellow-Americans
more tolerant and genial, less condemnatory and ignorant than they were before, in these
long-shrouded areas of human intimacy. It would be a great step backwards to rescind this
openness, and to strengthen the dark forces of censorship.
Quoted in PHILIP NOBILE & ERIC NADLER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. SEX 194-95 (1986).
349. See CLOR, supra note 105; Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the
Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L REv. 1275 (1998).
350. Cf. Heyman, supra note 349 (arguing that although current First Amendment doctrine makes
middle positions analytically unprincipled and hard to articulate, moderation has been achieved).
351. For anecdotes, see HYDE, supra note 17, at 11-15 (summarizing nine "representative"
accounts of harm by forfeiture); LEVY, supra note 177, at 128-29 (recounting stories of innocent, or
relatively innocent, persons who lost automobiles and homes). In response to the one-sided nature of
writing about forfeiture, one student commentator has rather wistfully wondered what "the
proforfeiture camp" would say. See Hakala, supra note 167, at 1324. We don't know.
352. See Cassella Statement, supra note 188. Elsewhere, Cassella has lamented the limited
availability of restitution under federal civil forfeiture laws. See Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture
Reform: A View From the Justice Department, 21 J. LEGIS. 211, 222 (1995) (noting that property
forfeited at the federal level has never been used to pay restitution, "except in bank fraud cases. And
that's got to change.").
353. On predatory pricing, see ROBERT I. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 144-60 (1978)
(suggesting that market forces will defeat predatory pricing, rendering judicial remediation
unnecessary). For a response to Bork, see Robert Prentice, Vaponvare: Imaginary High-Tech
Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 1163, 1192-95 (1996).
On insider trading, see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 110 (1966)
(contending that insider trading is harmless, and indeed benefits innovative risk-takers). For a
summary of attacks on this thesis, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 977 (5th ed. 1994). Cf. Bishop, supra note 238 (making
a similar argument in behalf of the economic loss rule).
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principle and practice. At the doctrinal level, forfeiture has engendered
a rich line of Supreme Court cases that help to explain the boundary
between civil and criminal law." Finally-and cynically, I admit-one
may note that forfeiture creates middle-class victims of the "war on
drugs," a constituency that may need to develop before this disastrous
enterprise can be put to an end.355
The delaying of rationalist reform in accident law has yielded a
clearer set of benefits. Depictionalism behind the rule of no recovery
for pure economic loss has not only served to limit the number of
claims (in a way that tends to burden enterprises more than individuals,
and thereby to permit loss spreading) but also helped to shape gradually
such problematic tort concepts as duty and proximate cause.356 Accident
law was thus spared some of the instability experienced in California,
where in the late 1970s foreseeability abruptly overtook narrow duty
rules-only to be jolted out of its ascendancy after a conservative state
supreme court judiciary took office.357 The economic loss rule has also
kept contract principles relatively intact against the hegemonic tenden-
cies of tort, an outcome with considerable support among practitioners
and scholars.358 Products liability also keeps contract doctrine vigorous,
whereas rationalist critics would subsume virtually all products liability
into negligence.35 9 Depictionalism in products liability preserves a
354. The effect of double-jeopardy rights on the combination of civil and criminal penalties has
received attention recently from the Court. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997)
(holding that administrative action did not, under Double Jeopardy Clause, preclude subsequent
criminal indictment); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (finding no violation of Double
Jeopardy Clause in criminal prosecution coupled with forfeiture); Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (holding that "marijuana tax" violates Double Jeopardy Clause). A
former Assistant to the Solicitor General who wrote an amicus brief in Bennis v. Michigan defends
Bennis by arguing that a contrary outcome would have disturbed the delicately evolving doctrinal
treatment of the civil-criminal distinction. See Richard H. Seamon, "Not Noiv" Does Not Necessarily
Mean "Not Ever:" The Supreme Court's Refusal in Bennis v. Michigan to Abandon the "Guilty
Property" Fiction of Forfeiture Law, 48 S.C. L. REv. 389, 391 (1997).
355. For one of many arguments that the war on drugs is a spectacular failure, see Blumenson &
Nilsen, supra note 169, at 37 n.18 (providing poll data); id. at 37-39 (citing staggering statistics of war
on drugs-S50 billion per year in federal and state law enforcement budgets; 500,000 possession-of-
marijuana arrests per year-and noting that a majority of federal inmates are incarcerated for drug
offenses).
356. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 289-92 (6th
ed. 1996) (discussing cases).
357. For a survey of expansion and retreat in California tort law, see Rabin, supra note 246, at
1518 (noting extraordinary influence of activist jurisprudence in California tort law); Nicolas P.
Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L REv. 717, 770-75 (1993) (describing rise-and-fall pattern of
California tort expansions).
358. See Bernstein, supra note 31, at 1544 n.25, 1548-51 (discussing preference for contract
over tort among business persons, practicing lawyers, and scholars).
359. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 5.
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heritage stretching back at least as far as Rome, and the loss of contract
in products liability would be regrettable.?"
Certainly it is awkward to praise-or appear to praise-an equiva-
lent to "all deliberate speed" that allows irrational doctrines to continue
hurting innocent people. The history of court-sanctioned segregation
warns against such complacency. 6' Aware of this awkwardness, I offer
my defense of depictionalist delay as distinctly subordinate to a de-
scription of the phenomenon. Depictionalism is ineradicable, but also
(and here it differs from de jure segregation in schools) not entirely
pernicious.
Even the best-laid plans of rationalist law reform have had unfortu-
nate consequences. Whereas rationalism thinks of itself as a force for
healthy simplicity-improvement through streamlining-it also adds to
an existing clutter. Observers of efforts to improve the Internal Revenue
Code have testified to the rarity of true simplification.36 2 One need not
join the chorus of alarm about "hyperlexis" or a "litigation explo-
sion" to worry about the problem of making more law.363 Depictional-
ism, a far-from-ideal source of delay, curbs some of the tendency to
haste and excess that is inherent in law reform agendas.
IV
FREEDOM AND THE REPRESENTATIONAL DIALECTIC
Even though they stand at opposite sides in the dialectic, both
depictionalism and rationalism threaten freedom. The Nobel laureate
Friedrich von Hayek, famous for his writings on freedom," recognized
this paradox. His student, Shirley Robin Letwin, has written that, ac-
cording to Hayek, "freedom" cannot be counterposed to "power;" the
choice for human beings is "only between different kinds of con-
straint." '365 Depictionalism and rationalism each offer a different kind of
360. See Jolowicz, supra note 259, at 381 (discussing the survival of contract liability in the face
of products liability reform efforts in the European Economic Community).
361. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown' Law Reform and
the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 Wmi. & MARY L Rv. 547 (1995) (arguing that the Brown
experience illustrates limitations of too-slow law reform). Although the victims of obscenity law are
more famous, it bears mention that Americans have been killed because of forfeiture. See Blumenson
& Nilson, supra note 169, at 97 (recounting the death of an innocent property owner following
forfeiture excesses).
362. See Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on
Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 15 (1982); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the
Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDIANA L. RpV. 319, 351 (1994).
363. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean
Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L REv. 933, 942 (1997)
(recommending a slow pace in progressive law reform).
364. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); HAYEK, supra note 314.
365. Shirley Robin Letwin, The Achievement of Friedrich A. Hayek, in EsSAYS ON HAYEK 147,
163 (Fritz Machlup ed., 1976).
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constraint. Below I elaborate on my view that the constraint of depic-
tionalism, because of its opacity, is the more worrisome of the two.
Having evoked the controversial figure of Hayek, I should clarify
my use of the word "freedom." Of the many writers who have ex-
pressed their interest in this concept, some (myself excluded) call them-
selves "libertarian," a divisive and misunderstood term366 whose fraught
meanings I hope to sidestep with the help of parsimonious ground rules.
One working definition of libertarianism mentions three credos of the
faith: "laissez-faire in economic policy, isolationism in foreign policy,
and liberalism on the question of criminal prohibitions."367 The first two
tenets being irrelevant to this Article, I focus here on the third, the one
that I espouse. A liberal approach to criminal prohibitions-or to legal
regulation in general -suggests a need to influence the representational
dialectic in the direction of greater public justification. Such a move
requires us to recognize that depictionalism does not reliably cooperate
in this goal.
A. The Peril of Depictionalism
Left unexamined, depictionalism erodes liberty. Depictionalism
purports to locate power, agency, or meaning within objects. These im-
ages block the view of the manipulators who can stand behind them.
Such an obstruction might take place by design. When former Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh proclaimed, for instance, that "it's now
possible for a drug dealer to serve time in a forfeiture-financed prison
after being arrested by agents driving a forfeiture-provided automobile
while working in a forfeiture-funded sting operation,""36 he set up
physical things-persons, automobiles, operations-in a tableau, dis-
tracting public attention from forfeiture in its rationalist sense. To the
rationalist, forfeiture is a function of money, incentives, and violence.3 9
Officials have found it advantageous to hide behind things.37
More often, the statism of depictionalist legal doctrines does not
line up with an official agenda. Government officials do not profit di-
rectly from products liability or the rule of no recovery for pure eco-
nomic loss. But even in these gentler doctrinal incarnations,
depictionalism gives unseen power to the state. For example, with prod-
ucts liability, government power expanded in the form of wider reme-
dies and a larger writ for judicial involvement. Products liability shares
this power with injured persons; when the term "products liability"
366. On the difficulties surrounding the term libertarianism, see DAVID BOAZ, Introduction, in
THE LIBERTARIAN READER at iii, xiii-xvi (1997).
367. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 15 (1984).
368. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 89.
369. See supra notes 195-218 and accompanying text.
370. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 88-92.
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crystallized, legal rules became more generous to plaintiffs. The rule of
no recovery for pure economic loss appears on the surface to be a con-
trary development. Product liability lets plaintiffs into court; pure eco-
nomic loss keeps them out. But this rule too augments judicial power,
particularly to create tort jurisdiction beyond the planning of parties
bound by contract and to make outcomes, as well as taxonomies, de-
pend on fortuitous consequences rather than on events that the parties
control.
Similarly, obscenity law seems moderate in its effects-I have said
so myself 7 ' -especially given the absence of a neo-Comstock figure
carrying out an agenda of censorship at the national level. Yet obscen-
ity, like other depictionalist legal rules, has augmented state power with-
out providing for appropriate accountability in rationalist terms. As we
have seen, obscenity law has declined to emphasize causal propositions
about harm, looking instead for essence. 72
This lack of analytic precision about harm has hidden the consoli-
dation of government power. Agents of the government have sup-
pressed works of great merit, imprisoned and persecuted and fined their
distributors, and discouraged publishers from making available other
material, forever unknown because unpublished, to an audience of read-
ers. 3 The lack of precision has helped to delineate artistic boundaries to
exclude erotic material, thereby promoting an impoverished under-
standing of what can be art and literature.374 And some writers have
contended-against opposition-that the suppression of material
deemed obscene has oppressed women, with the assistance and acquies-
cence of the state.375
371. See supra text accompanying note 348.
372. See supra Section II.A.
373. "Not a week passes," wrote H.L. Mencken in 1917, "that I do not decline to publish some
sound and honest piece of work," for fear that "some roving Methodist preacher, self-commissioned
to keep watch on letters, will read indecency into it." Mencken enumerated as casualties "four or
five short stories of the very first rank, and the best one-act play yet done.., by an American."
Quoted in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 126, at 63. See also 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LiMrTs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 130-32 (1985) (summarizing views of Anthony Burgess on the costs
of censorship). Some social scientists identify other foregone benefits, arguing that the cathartic
effect of pornography can help to prevent rape. Compare NOBILE & NADLER, supra note 348, at
253-54 (describing findings of Emory psychiatrist Gene Abel about cathartic benefits of
pornography), with OSANKA & JOHANN, supra note 112, at 142-43 (summarizing skepticism about
catharsis among psychologists).
374. See FEINBERG, supra note 373, at 132-33 (quoting Kenneth Tynan: "Because hard-core
performs an obvious physical function, literary critics have traditionally refused to consider it a form
of art. By their standards, art is something that applies to such intangibles as the soul and the
imagination: anything that appeals to the genitals belongs in the category of massage"); see also id. at
128 (noting that the Supreme Court has followed this line of thought, limiting obscenity to the erotic
even though it could have expanded obscenity to cover such expressions as profanity).
375. See BARTLETT & HARuus, supra note 154, at 650-51 (describing concern that allowing the
government to suppress pornography will result in censorship of lesbian erotica); Carlin Meyer, Sex,
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The result of these effects of depictionalism has been to render law
lawless. Images distract public attention from the state's tendency to
augment its power by available means. For example, law enforcers do
not request or demand bluntly that their budgets be hidden from public
or legislative scrutiny; such a posture would provoke complaints about
separation of powers. These officials can, however, hide behind forfeited
property to effect a comparable result.376 In a similar strategy of ex-
ploiting visible objects, partisans in the products liability debate thrust
an image-or in Gary Schwartz's term, a myth377-against their antago-
nists: the flaming Pinto and the creepy, spidery Dalkon Shield do battle
against hot spilled coffee and noble, valiant drugs martyred to corporate
fears about liability.37 In the next Section, I argue that rationalism can
put these images in a more suitable context, and thereby help restore
lawfulness to law.
B. Rationalism and Public Justification
The United States Constitution holds government accountable to
citizens. Due process rights protect individuals in their dealings with the
state.37 9 The constitutional law principle called "substantive due proc-
ess" establishes an analogous requirement for law generally: law ought
to be intelligible through reason."' As legal scholars, notably Lon
Fuller, have explained, reason would be integral to American law even if
constitutional law had said nothing about it: without reasoning one
cannot argue, interpret texts, create or follow precedent, link cases
together to form doctrine, or predict judicial outcomes.38' Moreover,
Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 Tx. L REv. 1097, 1138-41 (1994)
(arguing that whether pornography subordinates or liberates women depends on context, a point lost
in the current debate over pornography); John Money, A Conspiracy Against Women, in NOBILE &
NADLER, supra note 348, at 339 (arguing that anti-pornography stance of the Meese commission
"affirms that women have no right to be sexual. They are obliged only to be loving wives committed
to their men, whom they must treat not as sex, but as status and success, objects"). Marcia Pally, an
outspoken critic of feminist efforts against pornography, denies that pornography harms women: "It
seems more reasonable that violence against women begins with economic discrimination, so that
men learn to consider women burdens and pains in the ass, and with the infantilization of women-
either as fragile figurines or hormonal hurricanes-so that men hold women in contempt." Marcia
Pally, Ban Sexism, Not Sex, in NOBILE & NADLER, supra note 348, at 343-44.
376. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 84-100.
377. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L REV. 1013 (1991).
378. I elaborate in Bernstein, supra note 22, at 45-49.
379. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
380. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that if a statute purports to protect
"the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, [but] has no real or substantive relation to
those objects," it is unconstitutional); see also Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. LJ. 453,
455 (1996).
381. See Lon Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L REV. 376, 381 (1946)
(describing common law in terms of a relation between reason and fiat, which corresponds to natural
and positive law); see also STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
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citizens cannot follow the law unless their facility for reason aids them
in understanding legal rules. 82
Commentators call this obligation "public reasonableness" or
"public justification." '383 "[T]he application of power," writes political
theorist Stephen Macedo, "should be accompanied by conscientious
and open efforts to meet objections with reasons ... ."I" To be sure,
the historical record does include some dissent from this liberal ideal in
Western societies. 85 Readers who accept the desirability of public justifi-
cation, however, ought to agree that rationalism rather than depictional-
ism advances the pursuit.
Candor forces examiners of the dialectic to acknowledge the com-
forts of depictionalism within a divided political culture. Agreement that
obscenity or pornography is bad, for instance, unites a fragmented
population that might otherwise expend its energies on hopeless quar-
rels; a demand for public justification of obscenity law would uncover
conflicts, or at least a multiplicity of justifications, that might upset an
unspoken compromise among factions.386 Even Professor Macedo, the
public-justification partisan, admits that on occasion he would favor
"papering over divisive questions. ''311 As Macedo elaborates, down-
playing public justification offers other benefits, including "domestic
peace" and the need to make liberalism an attractive "export-
commodity" whose price in certain regions of the world might seem
too high. 88
Yet the demands of rationalism suggest that unexamined depiction-
alism in legal doctrines threatens such fundamentals as citizenship, de-
mocracy, liberal politics, and justice through law. In a democracy, state
power ought to be visible rather than hidden, and amenable to verbal
explanation rather than concealed behind images. Only when the state
25-26 (1985) (noting the importance of both inductive and deductive reasoning in legal development);
Stanley Mosk, The Common Lav and the Judicial Decision-Making Process, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 35, 35-36 (1988) (offering, from the perspective of an appellate judge, a view that the
common law is "the embodiment" of reason and justice). It may be necessary for me to warn against
esteeming reason as lofty above everything else, even though I have already sounded this warning in
another context. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L REv.
445, 455-64 (1997) (contending that current sexual harassment doctrine overstates the value of
reason and reasonableness).
382. See PATrERSON, supra note 37.
383. See MACFDO, supra note 39, at 40; Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAuL L.
REv. 1083, 1091 (1990); see also RAwLs, supra note 39, at 17 (describing the conditions of justice in
terms of what "rational persons" will choose in the original position thought experiment).
384. MACEDO, supra note 39, at 40.
385. See supra Part I (adverting to illiberal regimes and ideologies); see also MACEDO, supra
note 39, at 41-43 (summarizing criticisms).
386. See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
387. MACEDO, supra note 39, at 68.
388. Id.
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acknowledges and illuminates its exercise of power can citizens decide
whether to support or reject this constraint on their freedom-a freedom
that, according to American political theory, predates and outweighs the
power of government."9
This process of delivering accountability in rationalist terms must,
and does, occur in stages, initiated by various participants in the legal
system and perpetually subject to debate, refutation, and expansion.
Much of this accounting has begun. For example, the Supreme Court
has shown a longstanding interest in the interrelation of civil asset for-
feiture and the constitutional rights of individuals. Its 1996 forfeiture
decisions, Bennis v. Michigan39" and United States v. Ursery,391' recognize
a need to make sense of this depictionalist category and suggest that
more detail will be forthcoming from the Justices.3 92 In Congress, Henry
Hyde continues to make a case for rationalism that has won praise for its
pragmatic compromises and its inclusion of a wide range of views across
the liberal-to-conservative spectrum.393 Other political actors could aug-
ment these rationalist efforts. Instead of denouncing irrationality in her
next forfeiture brief, for example, a litigator might acknowledge the ap-
peal and resonance of depictionalism and argue for some attainable,
moderate quantity of public justification. Trial judges who decide acci-
dent law cases have opportunities to consider the burden of depictional-
ist rules.394
To balance the blandness of these suggestions-try a little public
justification, concede some of the appeal of depictionalism rather than
declaim the irrationality and senselessness of one's opponents, horse-
trade with the Justice Department as does Congressman Hyde-I men-
tion a more disquieting idea: readers should reflect on what is probably
the most potent phrase in all of depictionalist law, "child pornogra-
phy." As I must hasten to say, this invitation is not to change the abso-
lutist posture of current law, nor to condone or even tolerate material
that falls under this label, but to open a line of thought about rational-
ism and public justification.
In New York v. Ferber,395 the Supreme Court held unanimously that
"child pornography" warrants no constitutional protection. 96 "For the
first time in four decades," writes Professor Tribe, "all nine Justices
389. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. IX, X (noting reservation of unenumerated rights and powers);
TRIBE, supra note 107, at 2-5.
390. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
391. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
392. See Seamon, supra note 354, at 398-400 (laying out potential directions for the Court to
take).
393. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 105-07 (describing Hyde's efforts).
394. See supra note 257.
395. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
396. Id. at 756-66.
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agreed that a particular kind of communicative material enjoys no first
amendment protection whatsoever."3 97 The decision has provoked al-
most no hostility in the law reviews, and commentators seem to find little
of interest in the opinion for an undivided Court. This neglect is unfor-
tunate, because Ferber illustrates how public justification can improve
depictionalist doctrines like obscenity.
The New York statute upheld in Ferber criminalized the distribu-
tion of material depicting sexual performances by children younger
than sixteen.3 9 For many members of the public, I believe, a simple af-
firmation of Paul Ferber's conviction would have sufficed. Yet four
Justices wrote opinions. These opinions are replete with rationalist ef-
fort.
As many antagonists of pornography have observed, the mere
framing of criminal, abusive, or exploitative behavior into a "work"
does not negate the prior fact of crime or abuse or exploitation.399 Here
it is reasonable to presuppose the presence of harm. The New York leg-
islature made a finding that children were in danger, and supported that
finding with evidence.' Tribe commends Ferber for having taken
"careful note" of the problem of harm to underage performers in por-
nographic displays."' As Frederick Schauer has added, Ferber contains
not one word about the harm to viewers that child pornography might
occasion. 2 Lacking better data that effects on viewers threaten third-
party victims, the Court rightly adhered to the liberal and rationalist pre-
cept that the ambition to uplift human souls does not justify the use of
government power. 3 A focus on harm unites the Ferber opinions and
justifies putting Paul Ferber in prison.
The Court also expressed an admirable rationalist concern for con-
sequences and possible excesses. For instance, Justice White's opinion
for the Court demands scienter, and so a defendant cannot be convicted
unless he knows the nature of the material.' The Court also expressed
legitimate worries about overbreadth and vagueness, deciding in the end
397. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 914. Moreover, the topics from 1942 to which Tribe alludes-
commercial speech and fighting words-are no longer considered utterly out of the reach of First
Amendment protection, rendering child pornography almost unique.
398. See 458 U.S. at 749. Strictly speaking, Ferber is not an obscenity decision, because its
holding applies to material that cannot be classified as obscene. See id. at 764 (noting that "[tihe test
for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard..
399. See MACKINNON, supra note 137, passim.
400. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757-58.
401. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 914.
402. See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 285, 291.
403. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
404. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. See also SCHAUER, supra note 146, at 222-26 (discussing value
of scienter requirement in obscenity law).
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that the danger to children outweighed these concerns. °5 These ration-
alist articulations deal honestly with the bugbear of child pornography,
recognizing that it could override reason if the state does not fulfill the
demands of public justification.
Professor Schauer has praised Ferber for its subtle and careful
handling of the question of harm. Settled-though perhaps erratically
applied-First Amendment precedent allows the government to suppress
speech that raises a danger of imminent harm.406 Ferber does not rely on
this tradition, Schauer argues, preferring a more eclectic array of state
interests in the regulation of pornography: "Not every enormous state
interest can fit neatly into Brandenburg's incitement-immediacy-
inevitability formula," Schauer continues, and Ferber thus contributes
to a dynamic and evolving conception of harm.4"7 Absolutists might
worry about public justification offered so imprecisely. But even for
readers who want incitement and immediacy and inevitability, Ferber is
a rationalist triumph. If a category like child pornography can withstand
the rigors of public justification, then citizens should not flinch from
rationalism.s
CONCLUSION
It is perilous for a law review writer to express, however guardedly,
her esteem for images. Despite the occasional claim that reason is in dis-
repute within jurisprudence, 9 divergent approaches to law unite around
their common enthusiasm about rationality. Naturalist lawyers have
written that human reason tells individuals what the law is.410 Formalists
think that legal categories grounded in logic explain the past, and pre-
dict the outcome of future disputes."' Legal realists applaud rational
attention to the functions of law.412 Critical theorists explain law in terms
405. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766-69.
406. See Schauer, supra note 402, at 304-06 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
407. Id. at 305.
408. Justice Breyer has written a script: "What policy does [any law] serve? What purpose does
it serve? What's the theory... ?" See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
409. See Sherry, supra note 380, at 458-59 (naming various legal scholars who have "exposed"
and "rejected" reason); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON 27-31
(1997) (ascribing to "multiculturalists" the view that knowledge and reason are contingent, socially
constructed, and manipulated).
410. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41; LON L FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
411. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 547 (1988) (ascribing to formalism
the virtues of "predictability, stability, and constraint of decisionmakers"); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955 (1988).
412. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 260 (1930) (urging skepticism and the
shedding of illusions); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 464 (1909) (noting the
law's lack of attention to "human conditions").
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of power and other articulable interests 13 Jurisprudential liberals, advo-
cating "fundamental rights," '414 believe that shared and accepted con-
cepts about law align disparate cases into a legal system.41 Legal
economists, who we have seen to be exceedingly devout rationalists,
work from a behavioral ideal that posits away anything tangible, unique,
or incommensurable.416
Among these traditions that are usually inclined to quarrel with one
another, we find one point of harmonious agreement: all are congruent
with law efforts opposed to the entrenchment of physical objects in cer-
tain areas of American law. I have used the word "depictionalism" to
describe this entrenchment. This Article has examined three areas of law
where depictionalism flourishes, noting several others along the way.417
By clinging to objects and images, crucial elements of obscenity, for-
feiture, and accident law defy or ignore fundamentals of rationalism.
Obscenity criminalizes things without identifying their harm. Forfeiture
ascribes guilt and evil to inanimate objects. Accident law has separate
rules for harm to things and harms by things, putting plaintiffs in a
stronger position when a defendant hits something tangible (the eco-
nomic loss rule) and when a tangible entity hits them (products liability)
even if the presence of a thing is entirely incidental to tortious conduct.
Rationalist critics decry these postures, but have not succeeded in
changing them.
In an effort to explain both the development of non-rational legal
rules and the patterns of argument against them, I have described a rep-
resentational dialectic. Throughout Western history, rationalists have
denounced images for their power: this same strength protects images
from attack. Rationalists also denounce persons who yield to this power,
using pejoratives like "superstition" and "idolatry." In the realms of
art, religion, political theory, philosophy and elsewhere, these condem-
nations have all achieved very little enduring success. I have attributed
this failure to the enduring appeal-the necessity-of images in human
understanding. Philosophers, political theorists, and experts in learning
theory agree that the physical image is indispensable to knowledge.
This strength of the image, however, should never be deemed pre-
emptive: abstractions and verbalization are needed to make order of
images. Moreover, the rationalist quest to make law amenable to rea-
soned understanding is often admirable. I have tried to lend support to
413. See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 174-76
(1994).
414. See id. at 164-65.
415. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 80 (1977).
416. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Lmv, 92 MICH. L. Rav. 779, 797 n.62 (1994).
417. See supra notes 9, 27, 226, and 315.
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the rationalist cause by arguing that its position on public justification is
a good thing. Law must challenge citizens to accept their human burden
of reason, as well as defend the monopoly that law holds on sanctioned
coercion.4"8 By referring to depictionalism and rationalism as paired
within a dialectic, I have contended implicitly that the two inform, ne-
gate, and support each other in a perpetually dynamic relation.4"9 The
representational dialectic, connecting American law with cultural change
by way of eclectic sources, helps to situate legal doctrine and law reform
within their larger history.
418. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-
17 (1987).
419. See ROBERT HEILBRONER, MARXIsM: FOR AND AGAINST 79 (1980) (calling the dialectical
method "always self-consciously interpretational, because its concern for 'essence'-rather than
facts-forces it to confront the ambiguous, many-layered context of events"); Schneider, supra note
1, at 599.
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